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INTRODUCTION

I

N autumn 2009, China’s most popular “YouTube clone” video sharing sites—historically havens for pirated content—suddenly began
purging unlicensed videos from their services.1 Simultaneously, they

1. See infra Part II.A.
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started spending enormous sums—hundreds of millions of dollars to
date—on exclusive licenses for the same videos they had served for free
only months before. This remarkable turnaround in China’s “copyright
Wild West” is all the more impressive because of its lasting effect: most
major video streaming sites still license their professional content and remain largely free of piracy, leading one site’s CEO to proclaim proudly,
“This is an industry with law and order.”2
In China, where copyright piracy is notoriously pervasive,3 Internet
businesses are fiercely competitive, and the expectations regarding copyright compliance are low, why would these market-leading sites alter their
business models on a dime and devote as much as half of their total expenditures to content acquisition?4 Was it the result of government pressure? Did copyright owners sue the sites into submission? Were the sites
seeking to spruce up their reputations for investors? In fact, the surprisingly simple explanation is that copyright owners identified and exploited
a vital economic pressure point: they prevailed upon major advertisers—
whose business the video websites most covet—to pressure the websites
into cleaning up their copyright act.5
In the example above, the copyright owners found a workable solution
to an age-old problem in copyright law: copyright infringement is global,
but enforcement is local. What recourse do copyright owners have in
markets where infringement is endemic and enforcement is largely ineffective? The traditional response is to bring lawsuits in the market where
infringement occurs. The international copyright system was designed to
facilitate just that: it ensures copyright owners can enforce their rights,
such as the rights of reproduction, distribution, display, or performance of
their works, in many countries regardless of whether the copyright owner
has ever published the infringed work there.6 The international copyright
system, however, is built on the assumption that rights granted in foreign
jurisdictions are meaningfully enforceable. The reality is that in many
countries, formal rights are difficult or nearly impossible to enforce effectively, which limits the efficacy of the current system.7 Efforts to fix this
problem have emphasized two strategies: refining the international copyright system through multilateral and bilateral agreements, and pressuring governments into providing the means for effective enforcement.8
2. Clifford Coonan, ‘Saturday Night Live’ Launches on Chinese Video Site Sohu,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 2, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sat
urday-night-live-launches-chinese-668177 (quoting Sohu.com CEO Charles Zhang).
3. See Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles: Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just
Survive in China’s High Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 472–81 (2014).
4. Id. at 487 (noting that in 2012 content acquisition accounted for one half of video
website Youku Tudou Inc.’s expenditures).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text; Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 257 (2012).
8. See infra Part I.A.
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While these high-level political and diplomatic efforts proceed slowly
and with largely disappointing practical results in important markets such
as China, Brazil, Russia, and India, among many others, rights holders
increasingly recognize that effective enforcement may be achieved
through indirect enforcement strategies to coerce compliance with existing copyright laws. This market-based enforcement occurs against the
background structure of copyright law, but does not rely on enforcement
through courts or administrative agencies. Rather, the approach uses vital
commercial pressure points to induce key intermediaries to police their
supply chains for infringement or to compel infringers to cease infringement. Under such approaches, the infringers’ cessation is not precipitated
by fear of copyright infringement liability and the potential damages,
fines, or injunctions that might result from judicial or administrative enforcement. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, such enforcement has little deterrent effect.9 Instead, these infringers fear losing access to key markets,
contracts, and deals.10
Under the right conditions, such an approach has the potential to be
more effective, both short and long term, than attempts to improve enforcement through treaty negotiations, formal amendments to national
laws, and diplomatic pressure. In the short term, it is possible for a market-pressure approach to yield effective copyright compliance almost immediately—something that mere changes in law cannot easily
accomplish. In the long term, coercing key infringers to “go legit” can
help establish a new group of local stakeholders with an interest in shifting market-wide norms toward copyright compliance.
Market-pressure strategies for global copyright enforcement parallel
similar initiatives in other fields of law, including environmental law and
labor law, that face chronic enforcement difficulties and widespread violations in emerging markets.11 Scholars in those fields have argued that
pressuring influential intermediaries, such as major transnational corporations, to impose and enforce environmental or workplace safety standards on suppliers in emerging markets can result in greater compliance
than traditional law enforcement efforts.12
To date, however, no legal scholarship has systematically studied this
emerging trend in the copyright context. Although market-pressure strategies are becoming a bigger part of copyright owners’ enforcement arsenal, no guiding principles or framework have been suggested for
understanding or optimizing these strategies. It is likely that many entities
engaging in market-pressure strategies are unaware they are even part of
an emerging trend with strategic commonalities. This Article seeks to fill
the gap in the literature by analyzing copyright owners’ use of cross-industry market pressures in lieu of traditional copyright enforcement to
9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See

infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
id.
infra Part III.C.
infra notes 272–280 and accompanying text.
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address widespread copyright infringement in territories where enforcement is substandard. While a robust strain of scholarship exists analyzing
and critiquing private copyright enforcement strategies, including the employment of encryption technologies and contracts,13 comparatively little
scholarship exists analyzing the cross-industry enforcement partnerships
now emerging with increasing frequency.14 Scholarship that does consider
the role of private cross-industry arrangements to reduce piracy typically
focuses on partnerships aimed at disincentivizing or eliminating end-user
infringements in the United States.15 For example, some scholars have
analyzed the “graduated response” approach that U.S.-based copyright
owners and Internet service providers jointly established to penalize Internet subscribers tabbed as repeat infringers.16 Another study analyzes
the phenomenon of so-called “second-level agreements,” whereby U.S.
copyright owners prospectively license major U.S. websites such as YouTube for inclusion of their content in user-generated derivative works.17
This Article, by contrast, examines the emerging trend in private crossindustry enforcement of pressuring “gatekeeper” intermediaries, both in
the United States and abroad, to condition market access of some kind on
compliance with copyright law in a corporate infringer’s jurisdiction.
To that end, this Article presents two case studies in which the marketpressure approach has been used, or is being used, to address copyright
infringement in markets with poor copyright enforcement records. In the
first case study, introduced above, copyright owners prevailed upon the
Chinese video sites’ advertisers to pressure the websites into purchasing
content licenses. The second case study canvasses U.S. software producers’ novel strategy of combining U.S. unfair competition law and market
pressures to curb widespread unlicensed software use by overseas manufacturers. This new theory of unfair competition holds that businesses
that enjoy the cost savings from using inexpensive pirated software in
their operations receive an unfair competitive advantage over businesses
that use licensed information technology and thereby incur higher pro13. See infra Part III.A.
14. Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 210 (2013) (“While the deference to
private ordering in user–industry and inter-industry settings has been widely tackled in
legal commentary, private ordering in the cross-industry context has yet to be studied in
detail.”) [hereinafter Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice].
15. See Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, 45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 198 (2012)
[hereinafter Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements]; Anne-Marie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV.
81, 81–82 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 15, at 84–85.
17. See Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, supra note 15, at 139. Of course, given
the global nature of the Web, the line between local and international is often blurred. See
Graeme W. Austin, Valuing “Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual
Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1155–57 (2002). The point here is not
that the effects of such agreements are local (often they are not), but rather they are arrangements between U.S-based entities to address U.S.-based conduct, even if the ultimate
effects are global.

174

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

duction costs.18 Attorneys general in four states—California, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Washington—have already invoked state unfair
competition laws to sanction foreign manufacturers accused of selling
goods produced using pirated software.19 A primary objective of this approach is to pressure major businesses and manufacturing operations to
purchase software licenses by threatening to limit their access to U.S.
markets.20
Building on these case studies, this Article presents a framework for
evaluating market-pressure strategies aimed at redressing infringement in
markets where traditional copyright enforcement has been largely ineffective. It draws on theories of “optimal targeting” (i.e., strategies that
enlist parties who are best situated to cost-effectively police wrongdoing)
and social norms to argue that a successful market-pressure strategy involves identifying and pressuring an intermediary (or group of intermediaries) that has sufficient leverage over the infringer to foreclose
market access (e.g., retail markets, markets for advertisers, and so on). It
further argues that although some intermediaries might be in a strong
position to apply initial pressure, either through formal contract-based
rights or as a result of a business relationship with the infringer, they
might be poorly positioned to police infringing behavior on an ongoing
basis, either because they lack the practical ability to exercise ongoing
control or because of the high costs of monitoring and enforcement.
Therefore, a market-pressure strategy is most likely to succeed if it stimulates among the targeted infringers a reshaping of social norms concerning copyright compliance. Market-pressure strategies that do not result in
the shaping of social norms among infringer groups are unlikely to be
effective long term unless intermediaries are willing and able to shoulder
the costs of enforcement (for example, imposing and enforcing contract
terms requiring that a supplier’s processes are copyright compliant).
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the international
copyright system and describes the challenges U.S. copyright holders face
18. See generally WILLIAM KERR & CHAD MOUTRAY, NAT’L ASS’N MFRS., ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF GLOBAL SOFTWARE THEFT ON U.S. MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS AND
INNOVATION (2014); Andrew F. Popper, Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to
IT Theft, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 27 (2013).
19. See Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Kamala D. Harris Files Unfair Competition Lawsuits Over Use of Pirated Software in Apparel Industry
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harrisfiles-unfair-competition-lawsuits-over-use; Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. of the
State of Mass., Company Fined for Using Pirated Software to Gain Unfair Advantage
Over Massachusetts Businesses (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-10-18-narong-seafood-co.html; Press Release, Nat’l Alliance for Jobs & Innovation, State AGs Developing Groundbreaking Solutions to Battle IT
Theft and Unfair Competition, ABA Panelists Report (June 26, 2013), available at http://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130626006556/en/State-AGs-Developing-Ground
breaking-Solutions-Battle-Theft#.UtOA2HnpXHk [hereinafter ABA Panelists Report];
Press Release, Wash. Office of the Att’y Gen., Washington’s New Unfair Competition Law
Protects Local Company from Software Piracy (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.atg.wa.gov/
pressrelease.aspx?id=31143#.UxrAjdzpXi4.
20. See infra Part II.B.
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in achieving legal redress for infringements in jurisdictions with subpar
copyright enforcement. It also explains the principle of territoriality and
why attempts to use U.S. courts to redress foreign infringements are
rarely fruitful. Part II introduces two case studies in which copyright owners, faced with scant viable legal enforcement options, have turned to
market-pressure models in hopes of achieving compliance with copyright
law in a more targeted and effective manner than through traditional legal enforcement. It notes that the key commonality between the two
cases is that in each, copyright owners seek to tie market access in some
form to copyright law compliance, rather than attempting to coerce compliance through traditional legal copyright enforcement tactics. Part III
sets forth a framework for analyzing market-pressure strategies. It argues
that a hybrid enforcement strategy combining law and market-based
pressures can be effective, but success is largely dependent on whether
the strategy impels changes in the infringer group’s copyright compliance
norms.
Part IV applies this framework to analyze and evaluate the case studies
described in Part II. It concludes that market-pressure strategies work
best when private enforcement is ongoing after the initial pressure is applied. Ongoing enforcement can occur through infringer group self-policing or through sustained enforcement efforts of pressuring intermediaries
(if the intermediaries are willing and able to cost-effectively police the
infringement). Thus, the market-pressure strategy succeeded in the first
case study—the Chinese video websites—because the targeted infringer
group formed a relatively small, close-knit community that developed a
symbiotic relationship with the pressuring intermediaries (the advertisers). When the advertisers applied pressure, the websites fairly easily assimilated the advertisers’ norms, which were generally aligned with those
of the copyright owners. In addition, the websites became content producers themselves, even more closely aligning their copyright compliance
norms with those of the copyright owners, and motivating self-policing
within the group. The challenges are steeper in the second case study, i.e.,
the use of U.S. unfair competition laws to address overseas software
piracy. There, the targeted group—potentially any manufacturer (in any
industry) that uses pirated software—is extremely loose-knit and diffuse.
Applying pressure to a few individual manufacturers from diverse industries is unlikely to effectuate the crucial anti-copying norm shifts among
infringers. In that case, the strategy must activate personal anti-copying
norms in infringers (a challenging task), or the pressuring intermediary
must be willing and able to cost-effectively control infringement on an
ongoing basis. Lastly, Part IV makes recommendations for improving the
efficacy of two ongoing efforts to use market-pressure strategies to tackle
global infringement: (1) the infringement-as-unfair-competition strategy
introduced in Part II, and (2) copyright owners’ current efforts to limit
global Internet peer-to-peer sites’ access to lucrative online advertising.
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I. THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. TERRITORIALITY

AND THE

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

The territoriality principle long recognized internationally21 and by
U.S. courts22 generally limits a state’s power to prescribe legal rules to its
own territory.23 Traditionally, this presented a vexing challenge for copyright owners: they were powerless to prevent the copying and sale of their
works outside their home countries, from whose laws authors’ rights
arose and at whose borders their rights terminated.24 This harmed the
revenues of authors and publishers, who were unable to protect or monetize their works in foreign markets and who had to compete in their own
markets with cheap copies of unprotected foreign works and even cheap
imported copies of their own works.25 International copyright law developed largely to address these problems by ensuring that authors in one
country enjoyed exclusive rights—and thus protection against unauthorized exploitation of their works—elsewhere.26
The backbone of international copyright law is the Berne Convention,
established in 1886.27 In addition to setting minimum standards for substantive copyright rights, Berne established the principle of “national
treatment” in international copyright law.28 That is, every Berne signatory must afford to works originating from other member states treatment that is no less favorable than it gives to works of its own nationals.29
Because the United States is a Berne signatory, U.S. nationals receive
protection automatically under the copyright laws of all other member
nations.30 This does not mean, however, that the Berne Convention vests
authors with an “international copyright.”31 Rather, it creates separate
rights in multiple parallel national copyright regimes.32
21. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE
63 (2001).
22. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 509–16 (1997).
23. Jane C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 318, 319
(1995).
24. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 31.
25. See id.; CATHERINE SEVILLE, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW:
BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE BLACK FLAG IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 41 (2006).
26. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 29–47; SEVILLE, supra note 25, at 41–71.
27. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 994–99 (2002).
28. See id. at 994–95.
29. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5 (1971
Paris text), July 24, 2971, 111 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
30. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 742 (2001).
31. Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 330.
32. Id. As Professor Ginsburg explains, “[a]n author and international copyright
owner [is] . . . at once[ ] the proprietor of a French copyright, a U.S. copyright, a Mexican
copyright, a Japanese copyright, and so on.” Id.
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The efficacy of this international copyright system based on territoriality and national treatment depends at the very least on each member
country affording other nations’ authors not only substantive rights, but
also the ability to effectively enforce those rights. Owning copyright
rights in China, India, and Brazil, for example, means little if enforcement
efforts prove ineffective in those territories. Copyright owners’ enforcement efforts are often frustrated in emerging markets due to endemic
systemic deficiencies, including under-resourced and poorly coordinated
enforcement agencies and civil remedies that are too low to deter widespread infringement.33 Other obstacles to effective enforcement can include official corruption and local protectionism,34 as well as chronically
overburdened court systems that produce years of procedural delay or
deter the filing of enforcement actions altogether.35 Individual nations
have sovereignty over all aspects of their domestic intellectual property
(IP) laws, including enforcement, however. So for a century following the
advent of Berne, there was little that nations or their creative professionals could do about a lack of effective enforcement in other territories.36
Recognizing this, in the 1980s IP owners in developed countries, particularly the United States, successfully lobbied their governments to tie the
international IP regime, including its minimum IP enforcement standards,
to international trade.37 As a result, a nation can gain admission into the
elite global trade body, the World Trade Organization (WTO), only by
agreeing to adopt the minimum IP standards in the Berne Convention
and the WTO’s mandatory Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).38 TRIPS provides that member countries
that fail to comply with those standards may be subject to dispute resolution proceedings.39 The purpose of establishing a global IP system tied to
the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism was to give teeth to international IP commitments and improve and standardize enforcement
33. For a discussion of the factors contributing to copyright enforcement deficiencies
in China, for example, see Priest, supra note 3, at 477–81; MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY
AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 221–47
(2009); ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 133–47 (2006); Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in
China, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 795, 822–34 (2006) [hereinafter, Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China].
34. See ARUL GEORGE SCARIA, PIRACY IN THE INDIAN FILM INDUSTRY: COPYRIGHT
AND CULTURAL CONSONANCE 162 (2014); Lawrence Liang & Ravi Sundaram, India, in
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 377 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011); Olga Sezneva &
Joe Karaganis, Russia, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra, at 171–74;
Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, supra note 33, at 822–24.
35. See, e.g., Pedro N. Mizukami et al., Brazil, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra note 34, at 227–29; SCARIA, supra note 34, at 161–62.
36. See Dinwoodie, supra note 30, at 734–46.
37. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 61–73 (2002).
38. See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
39. Id. art. 64.1.
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conditions.40
Coupling international IP law with trade has successfully induced countries to harmonize their laws to meet international minimum standards,
but it has proven less effective at improving enforcement conditions in
troubled markets.41 Proving that a country is noncompliant with TRIPS
can be difficult.42 Moreover, the threat of trade sanctions—and even their
use—has not necessarily led to improved IP enforcement.43
Frustrated by the inefficacy of the WTO dispute resolution system and
by stalled multilateral negotiations on IP enforcement,44 developed countries turned their attention toward new avenues for establishing stringent
and effective international IP standards.45 These efforts have focused on
negotiating a new generation of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade
agreements46 (including the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA)47 and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)48) often referred to as “TRIPS-plus” agreements because they require protection
levels that exceed the minima mandated by TRIPS.49 Critics of these next
generation agreements are troubled that they allegedly result from nontransparent and undemocratic processes and take advantage of developing countries’ weaker negotiating leverage.50 Some also doubt these
40. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 952–53 (3d ed. 2013).
41. See Yu, supra note 7, at 243.
42. See id. at 242. According to Professor Yu, developing nations recognized when
negotiating TRIPS that “higher enforcement standards often come with a hefty price tag,
difficult tradeoffs, and significant intrusions on national sovereignty.” Id. They therefore
sought to create wiggle room in their implementation obligations. See id. They demanded
provisions that limited the amount of resources they must spend on IP enforcement and
pressed for the inclusion of vague and undefined terms such as “reasonable” and “effective” that made it more difficult to establish noncompliance. Id.
43. See Priest, supra note 3, at 476–77, 489–90 (discussing the daunting challenge of
enforcing copyright in China more than a decade after China’s accession to the WTO, and
despite the U.S. having brought two IP-related WTO cases against China).
44. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975,
988–98 (2011); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 161, 166–67 (2004) (“As momentum toward internationalization of
copyright law grew, it might not have been apparent . . . that this movement would still
meet substantial resistance. Post-TRIPS, copyright policymakers encountered difficulty in
reaching international consensus on a variety of new copyright issues.”) (footnotes
omitted).
45. See Yu, supra note 7, at 243.
46. Id.
47. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
48. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., The United States in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/
united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
49. See Margo A. Bagley, Legal Movements in Intellectual Property: TRIPS, Unilateral
Action, Bilateral Agreements, and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 781, 792–93
(2003).
50. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
465, 555 (2009) (noting that the lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations “has attracted an immense amount of criticisms in not only the less developed world, but also the
developed world”); Yu, supra note 44, at 1011–15 (discussing the non-transparent and un-
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agreements’ potential to be effective because these agreements seem ill
equipped to solve the vexing enforcement deficiencies that plagued
TRIPS.51
B. USING U.S. COURTS

TO

REMEDY FOREIGN INFRINGEMENTS

U.S.-based copyright owners are certainly entitled to bring copyright
infringement claims in most foreign jurisdictions where infringing acts occur,52 but in some jurisdictions that may be of little practical benefit.
Some aggrieved right holders therefore seek to leverage the United
States’ more developed legal system and stronger IP norms extraterritorially by bringing actions in U.S. courts for infringing acts that occur
abroad.53
As noted above, the territoriality principle generally limits the rights
arising under the U.S. Copyright Act to those places that the law
reaches.54 Congress may state the intended reach of a statute’s prescriptive jurisdiction; otherwise, courts may interpret the statute to determine
the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.55 In any event, U.S. courts have
long applied, and continue to apply, a presumption against extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act.56
Even if Congress intended for the Copyright Act to reach acts of infringement in other countries, rules of jurisdiction act as a practical limit
on the law’s extraterritorial reach.57 In order for a right holder to bring an
democratic nature of the ACTA negotiations); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough:
Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 451–52 (arguing that the negotiations for plurilateral agreements such as ACTA and TPP result from
developed nations engaging in “vertical forum shifting”—that is, “negotiating norm-setting, rule-making, implementation, and enforcement at levels below the multilateral level,”
which is a tactic that “clearly favors the powerful”).
51. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 518
(2011).
52. U.S.-based copyright owners acquire enforceable rights, for example, in all 168
Berne Convention member countries. See Berne Convention art. 5, supra note 29; World
Intell. Prop. Org., WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Berne Convention,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Mar.
27, 2015) (listing 168 Berne Convention members).
53. See Bradley, supra note 22, at 506.
54. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
55. Marketa Trimble, Advancing National Intellectual Property Policies in a Transnational Context, 74 MD. L. REV. 203, 213–14 (2015) (using the example of the U.S. Patent
Act, in which Congress expressly limited the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction in § 271(a)
to acts that occur “within the United States” while § 271(b) has been interpreted by courts
to reach acts of inducement to infringe that occur beyond U.S. borders) (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a), (b) (2012)). According to Professor Trimble, three factors combine to determine
the actual extent to which a national law is effective beyond national borders: the intended
territorial reach of the law as envisioned by the legislature; the law’s interplay with conflict
of law rules, including rules of jurisdiction; and the actual territorial scope of the country’s
enforcement power. Id. at 214–15.
56. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 97–99.
57. Trimble, supra note 55, at 214–15 (noting that rules of jurisdiction are limiting
factors on the extent to which a national law is actually effective beyond national borders).
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action in a U.S. court to redress a foreign infringement,58 the court must
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant and must also have jurisdiction over the subject matter.59 A court in the United States has general
jurisdiction over the defendant if the infringer is an individual domiciled
in the forum or a corporation that has such “continuous and systematic”
affiliations with the forum “as to render [the defendant corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.”60 In one case in which major Chinese Internet search engine Baidu was sued by a right holder in New
York for copyright infringements that occurred in China, such “contacts”
as listing on a stock exchange based in the forum, and hiring lawyers and
accountants in the forum to assist with the listing, were held insufficient
to justify general jurisdiction.61 Alternatively, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant if the controversy specifically “arises
out of” the defendant’s contacts with the forum.62 Infringements that occur abroad, however, generally have no direct connection to a U.S. forum
and so do not give rise to specific jurisdiction. In short, many foreign
infringers are simply unreachable by U.S. courts because they lack sufficient contact with a U.S. forum to establish general or specific
jurisdiction.
If a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant that infringed
abroad, it may also have subject matter jurisdiction. Claims under foreign
IP laws generally do not raise federal questions, but in a case against a
foreign defendant a U.S. plaintiff might be able to rely on diversity jurisdiction.63 Alternatively, a court with general jurisdiction over the defendant may hear claims even for infringements that occurred abroad and
therefore arise under foreign law if the court deems copyright infringe58. Of course, in the hyper-connected digital information age, what constitutes a “foreign” infringement is often unclear. See Austin, supra note 17, at 1155–57. Many infringing
acts have transnational or multinational components, raising complex questions of jurisdiction and choice of law. That said, an enormous number of infringements are still entirely
local in character: the Indian manufacturer that reproduces unauthorized copies of enterprise software in India, for example, or the Chinese-language website that provides unlimited unlicensed downloads from servers based in China that are inaccessible from
computers with IP addresses based outside of China. See Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity
of Copyright Laws on the Internet: Proposed Solutions, Objections to the Solutions, and the
Realities of Cross-Border Copyright Enforcement, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 339, 400–01 (2015) (noting that even in the Internet context, geolocation and
geoblocking technologies can minimize the likelihood of infringement in multiple jurisdictions). For the most part, the types of infringements with which this Article is concerned
are local in character. However, the problem of global ad networks funding globally accessible rogue peer-to-peer sites, discussed infra in Part IV.C.2, can involve cross-border infringement scenarios.
59. See Bradley, supra note 22, at 578–79.
60. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
61. Stormhale, Inc. v. Baidu.com, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
62. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
63. See Bradley, supra note 22, at 579. A federal court may exercise “diversity” subject
matter jurisdiction when the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of different states or
countries and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
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ment to be a “transitory” cause of action.64 Some U.S. courts have been
willing to entertain copyright infringement claims arising under foreign
law as transitory causes of action.65 Most courts, however, hold that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the U.S. Copyright Act for extraterritorial
infringements because the Act lacks extraterritorial effect.66 Regardless,
this is unhelpful in most cases of infringement abroad because most such
defendants are not domiciled in the U.S. and therefore are not subject to
general jurisdiction here in the first place.
Even if a court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, it may invoke the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss the
case when an adequate alternate forum exists (such as a court in the defendant’s home country) and various public and private interest factors
indicate dismissal would be proper.67 Lastly, in the event that a U.S. court
does exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant for a foreign act of
infringement, and does not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, the
defendant must have sufficient U.S. assets against which to enforce a
judgment, otherwise litigation avails the plaintiff nothing.68 In short, it is
64. See Trimble, supra note 58, at 357; 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (2011) (“If the plaintiff has a valid cause of action under
the copyright laws of a foreign country, and if personal jurisdiction of the defendant can be
obtained in an American court, it is arguable that an action may be brought in such court
for infringement of a foreign copyright law. This would be on the theory that copyright
infringement constitutes a transitory cause of action, and hence, may be adjudicated in the
courts of a sovereign other than the one in which the cause of action arose.”). “Transitory”
causes of action are those that may be heard in any court that has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. See Trimble, supra note 58, at 357.
65. See London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Commc’ns, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over a copyright
infringement claim that arose solely from foreign acts of infringement); Creative Tech. Ltd.
v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th
Cir. 1994) (noting a “long-standing principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States’” and indicating an unwillingness to “overturn over eighty years of consistent jurisprudence on the extraterritorial reach of the copyright laws”); see also Bradley,
supra note 22, at 523–24 (“[C]ourts consistently have held that U.S. copyright law, at least
as a general matter, does not apply beyond U.S. territorial boundaries.”).
67. See, e.g., Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 766 (9th
Cir. 1991) (dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds where U.S. plaintiff sued Japanese
defendant for infringement occurring in Japan and defendant brought parallel suit against
plaintiff pending in Japanese court); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d
696, 701 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds where Singaporean
plaintiff sued Singaporean defendant in U.S. court for infringement that occurred in
United States); Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 290–92 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds where British plaintiff sued British defendant for
infringement that occurred in the United Kingdom). But see Boosey & Hawkes Music
Publishers v. Walt Disney, 145 F.3d 481, 491–92 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply forum non
conveniens doctrine where U.K. plaintiff sued U.S. defendant for infringement in eighteen
foreign jurisdictions, but no infringing acts occurred in the United States); Bradley, supra
note 22, at 580 (“A dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is supposed to be the
exception, not the rule. Moreover, choice of law, although an important factor in the forum
non conveniens determination, is not the only factor to be considered, and courts often
refuse to dismiss cases on forum non conveniens grounds despite the existence of foreignlaw issues.”) (footnotes omitted).
68. See Trimble, supra note 55, at 216.
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extremely difficult to obtain a remedy in a U.S. court for acts of copyright
infringement committed by foreign entities entirely beyond U.S
borders.69
C. REMEDYING EXTRATERRITORIAL INFRINGEMENTS
INDIRECT COPYRIGHT LIABILITY

THROUGH

While many foreign infringers are beyond the reach of U.S. courts,
many have key business associates that are not. Some of these business
partners are important or even central to the foreign company’s operations and financial well-being, such as major U.S.-based customers, suppliers, or advertisers. Imagine, for example, a Brazilian original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) that infringes copyright by loading unlicensed copies of Windows, Excel, AutoCAD, or other enterprise software
onto its computers used in manufacturing and business operations geared
toward providing products and components to U.S. businesses. Imagine
further that the OEM’s livelihood depends on a few key U.S.-based customers, whose business financially supports the OEM and who directly
benefit from the cost savings enabled by the OEM’s use of free or inexpensive pirated software. (Large manufacturing and logistics operations
in BRIC countries reportedly often use unauthorized software worth tens
of thousands to millions of dollars.70) Do software companies have a
cause of action in the United States against the OEM’s U.S.-based customers? Similarly, might liability extend to U.S.-based companies that financially support copyright infringement by advertising on online video
portals in China that routinely make unlicensed movies and television
programs available to customers in China (but are inaccessible
elsewhere)?71
U.S. copyright law has a well-developed body of doctrine for extending
liability to third parties who do not engage in direct infringement but who
facilitate, control, or benefit from the infringements of others.72 The two
major strains of secondary copyright liability are vicarious liability and
contributory infringement.73
69. See id. at 254–55.
70. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., Letter to Federal Trade Commission Commissioners and the Director of the Bureau of Competition, Nov. 4, 2011 (citing a Chinese parts
manufacturer that uses unauthorized software valued at $5.2 million).
71. As discussed below, China does provide a safe harbor for online portals that passively host content at the direction of end users. See Priest, supra note 3, at 475 n. 30.
Therefore, an online video portal hosting unlicensed content is not necessarily a copyright
infringer, direct or contributory. However, as this Author has noted elsewhere, websites in
China have been found to host (or at least have been suspected of hosting) unlicensed
content at their own initiative in order to ensure a large stable of available, current content
in order to attract users. Id. at 472–73.
72. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005).
73. A third theory of indirect copyright liability, recently advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court, is “inducement” liability, which imputes liability to a third party who distributes a technology “with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.” Id. at 914,
936–37.
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1. Vicarious Liability
A U.S. court is unlikely to find vicarious or contributory liability for
conduct amounting to business dealings that benefit the infringer but are
not directly associated with the infringing activity. Under U.S. law, vicarious copyright liability arises when the third party obtains direct financial
benefit from the infringement and has the power to cease the infringing
conduct.74 Courts have not strictly construed the test to require that the
alleged vicarious infringer “directly” benefit from the infringement; even
the mere prospect of indirect benefit is sufficient.75 Accordingly, any potential indirect benefits (such as cost savings) that inure to the U.S. defendant’s benefit might satisfy this prong.76 Courts have applied the control
element more strictly, however, and are unlikely to find liability if the
third party does not have the right to shut down the infringing activity.77
A U.S.-based customer or retailer is unlikely to have the right to force its
overseas supplier to cease infringement or shut down operations if the
supplier installs unlicensed software on company PCs overseas. Similarly,
a U.S.-based advertiser will lack the right to shut down a foreign website
on which its ad appears adjacent to infringing content.
2. Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement arises when the third party has knowledge
of the infringing activity and induces, causes, or materially contributes to
the infringement.78 Courts have held that contributory infringement requires “actual knowledge” of specific instances of infringement79 or that
there be circumstances indicating that the alleged contributory infringer
should have known about the infringement.80 One court has ruled, for
example, that merely advertising on a website that hosts infringing material, without specific knowledge of the site’s activities, fails to result in the
requisite knowledge for contributory infringement purposes.81 Courts
have also required that the acts of alleged contributory infringement be
directly related to, and substantially involved in facilitating, the primary
74. See generally Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d
Cir. 1963).
75. See, e.g., Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1331
(D. Mass. 1994) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 159-60 (1976)).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 803–06 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that credit card companies lack “control” for vicarious liability purposes
because although their payment processing services helped enable and increase sales of
infringing content online, the credit card companies lack the right, contractual or otherwise, to shut down the infringing websites, block the transmission of infringing files, or
remove the sites from the Web).
78. See generally Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
79. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).
80. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 487 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A] finding of contributory infringement has never depended
on actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking place.”).
81. Elsevier Ltd. v. Chitika, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404–06 (D. Mass. 2011).
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infringement.82 Most U.S.-based customers or advertisers are unlikely to
be in a position to know whether their foreign supplier or partner is engaging in infringement. Even if provided with notice (and therefore
knowledge) of specific infringements, the U.S.-based entity’s general business dealings with the foreign infringer are unlikely to be considered
“material contributions” to the infringing activity.83 Accordingly, current
U.S. law on indirect liability is unlikely to extend liability to U.S.-based
business associates of foreign infringers if the U.S. entity neither controls
the foreign company nor materially contributes to the infringement.84
While U.S. law on secondary liability is unlikely to be helpful in connection with foreign acts of infringement, it is quite possible that, if faced
with the issue, a U.S. court might not apply U.S. law at all. Rather, in IP
cases, courts traditionally apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the act
of direct infringement took place.85 In such a case, a court might feel
compelled to apply the foreign jurisdiction’s law of contributory infringement.86 Still, this may not be of much benefit to the plaintiff. The foreign
jurisdiction’s secondary liability rules may be narrower or less developed
than U.S. law or less likely to extend liability. For example, in China indirect liability is an underdeveloped doctrine, subject to a high degree of
uncertainty and judicial discretion.87
Ultimately, however, it seems U.S. courts are unlikely to find that they
have subject matter jurisdiction at all with respect to secondary liability
claims arising from purely foreign infringements.88 While a U.S. court
may be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over a U.S.-based defendant, the territoriality principle and choice of law rules cast serious doubt
on whether a cause of action exists under U.S. law for secondary liability
when the primary infringement occurs abroad.89 Some federal courts
have held they have subject matter jurisdiction under the U.S. Copyright
Act when a defendant based in the United States “authorizes” others to
82. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 64, § 12.04[A][3][a].
83. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 796–98. (9th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 796.
85. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1998).
86. Cf. id. (discussing choice of law rules concerning copyright infringement
generally).
87. See Seagull Haiyan Song, A Comparative Copyright Analysis of ISP Liability in
China Versus the United States and Europe, 27 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 2, 8 (July
2010) (observing that “China does not have specific secondary liability theories, including
contributory, vicarious, or inducement theories developed in the United States,” but that
in online service provider copyright liability cases, Chinese courts “look to factors similar
to those assessed by US courts, including an ISP’s knowledge of infringement, intent, ability and rights to control infringing activity, financial benefits arising from infringing activities, and contribution to the infringing activity, for example”); Haitao Zhang, P2P
Operator Liable for “Contributory Infringement,” KING & WOOD IP BULLETIN (Mar.
2008), available at http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=P2P-Operator-Liable-forContributory-Infringement&language=en (“Currently, China provides no judicial interpretation regarding ‘contributory infringement,’ therefore, it is largely decided at the judges’
discretion.”).
88. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64, § 12.04 [D][2].
89. See id.
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commit infringing acts that occur abroad.90 More recent cases and a leading treatise reject that conclusion,91 however, finding that it is now “generally accepted” that no liability exists under the U.S. Copyright Act for
contributions to acts that occur beyond the territorial reach of U.S. law
and thus do not infringe any right under the Act.92
In sum, U.S. courts are unlikely (and seem to be increasingly so) to find
they have subject matter jurisdiction over controversies in which U.S. defendants’ actions contributed to acts of infringement that occurred entirely beyond U.S. borders. Even if a U.S. court does hear such a case, the
chances that it would hold a U.S.-based defendant indirectly liable for
conduct amounting to general business interactions seem vanishingly
small.93
Given the difficulty U.S.-based copyright owners often have enforcing
their rights abroad or achieving extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
copyright owners are increasingly turning to indirect, market-based enforcement strategies to impel compliance with copyright law.94 The next
Part introduces two case studies of such market-based enforcement.
II. ACHIEVING COPYRIGHT LAW COMPLIANCE THROUGH
MARKET PRESSURES: TWO CASE STUDIES
This Part offers two case studies that show how copyright owners have
employed market-based pressures to achieve copyright compliance in
emerging markets. The first case study describes the efforts of movie and
television program copyright owners to pressure Chinese video sharing
websites to remove infringing content and purchase licenses. The second
case study discusses software producers’ efforts to pressure large foreign
manufacturers into purchasing software licenses and ultimately changing
copyright compliance norms among such manufacturers.
A. THE RISE

OF

COPYRIGHT LICENSING
VIDEO WEBSITES

ON

CHINESE

1. Pressuring Advertisers to Police Chinese Video Websites for Pirated
Content
Since their inception in the mid-2000’s, sites such as Youku.com and
Tudou.com, the leaders of China’s fiercely competitive Internet video
90. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Cont’l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986);
ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 862 (E.D.Cal. 1992).
91. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1090–92 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 64, § 12.04[D][2].
92. Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
93. See Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148,
1153 (2007) (noting courts’ reluctance to hold third parties liable when the conduct does
not directly include the commission of some forbidden act, reflecting courts’ “discomfort
with the notion of punishing an ‘innocent’ third party, even when the instrumental benefits
of doing so are readily apparent”).
94. See infra Part II.
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streaming market,95 were notorious for hosting unauthorized copyrighted
video content.96 During the first half-decade of their existence, these
YouTube-style streaming video sites were rife with complete, unlicensed
domestic and foreign television programs and films for free, on-demand
public streaming, including such Hollywood hits as “Prison Break,”
“Lost,” and “Transformers.”97 To remain competitive and attract viewers, such streaming video sites had to ensure they were serving users the
latest and most desirable content.98 Hosting the latest television dramas
and films is especially important because Chinese Internet users have
generally been more interested in viewing professionally produced content than user-generated content.99
Nevertheless, by 2010, both Youku and Tudou were removing unlicensed videos in earnest.100 This fact alone is unremarkable, since Chinese copyright regulations provide online service providers with a safe
harbor from copyright infringement liability if they expeditiously remove
unlicensed content upon notification by the copyright owner.101 Removal
of content by service providers to comply with copyright safe harbor provisions rarely guarantees a net reduction in available unlicensed content,
however, since the expunged content often quickly reappears on the same
website.102 What is remarkable is that much of the content Youku and
Tudou removed from their sites remained unavailable thereafter, indicating that both companies were engaged in sincere, sophisticated, and pro95. See Watch This Space, ECONOMIST, (Mar. 17, 2012), available at http://
www.economist.com/node/21550283 (citing estimates by one research firm ranking
Youku.com as China’s online video market leader with 21.8 percent of the market, and
Tudou.com as the second most-used online video site in China with 13.7 percent market
share, and noting that other estimates suggest both firms have an even larger market
share).
96. See, e.g., Bruce Einhorn, The YouTube of China Goes Legit, BLOOMBERG BUS.
WK. (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_15/
b4223044746164.htm#_jmp0_ (“Youku launched in 2006 as a local version of YouTube,
which China’s censors have long banned, and quickly became a premier place to download
pirated movies and TV shows.”).
97. See, e.g., id.; Yi Zhou, Genuine Copyright Dilemma for Video Sharing Websites,
CHINA INTELL. PROP. (Wang Hongjun trans., June 2009), available at http://
www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=490; David Barboza, Booming Demand for TV on the Internet in China, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2010), available at
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/business/global/19chinavideo.html?_r=0.
98. Wang Fei’er, The Copyright Clash, GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012), http://
www.globaltimes.cn/content/691864.shtml.
99. Id.
100. Priest, supra note 3, at 486–87.
) [Regula101. Xinxi Wangluo Chuanbo Baohu Quan Tiaoli (
tions for the Protection of the Right of Communication through the Information Network]
(promulgated by the St. Council, May 10, 2006, effective July 1, 2006) ST. COUNCIL GAZ.,
Jul. 10, 2006, at 13 (China), translated in 3 CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARKS 90, 93–94 (2006).
102. See Andrew Orlowski, China’s Nonstop Music Machine, REG. (Sept. 13, 2008),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/13/baidu_investigation/. Even in the United States,
copyright owners complain that notice and takedown procedures create the potential for a
frustrating game of cat and mouse that places significant burdens on copyright owners as
well as Web companies, with few tangible results. See Paul Resnikoff, It’s Broken: Google
Is Now Fielding 300,000 Takedown Requests a Week. . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (May 24,
2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2012/05/24/google300000.
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longed efforts to eradicate unlicensed content. Indeed, both companies
began employing video “fingerprinting” technology to help them more
readily identify and reject infringing videos uploaded by users.103
More importantly, in addition to removing the infringing content,
Youku and Tudou began spending large sums to acquire exclusive online
distribution rights.104 With the disappearance of pirated content from the
major video sites, exclusive rights, which had little value in an environment in which piracy was endemic, became the primary tool by which
competing video sites could differentiate themselves.105 The result was a
meteoric rise in prices for exclusive online broadcast rights as video sites
bid up prices in a scramble to lock up as much exclusive content (and thus
viewers) as they could afford. In one example, the exclusive online broadcast rights for the popular Chinese television drama “Palace” reportedly
sold in October 2011 for $290,000 per episode.106 By comparison, just two
years earlier the exclusive online rights for the most popular show on
Chinese television, “Latent,” sold for a mere $1,500 per episode.107 By
2011, Tudou had spent nearly $50 million on content licenses, while content acquisition accounted for more than a quarter of Youku’s total expenditures.108 It is now common for a Chinese video site that acquires
exclusive licenses to monetize them not only through its own website, but
also to sublicense them to competing video websites to maximize viewership and revenue.109 Websites that continue to host unauthorized content
are now the target of lawsuits from competing sites that own exclusive
rights. Indeed, Youku and Tudou sued each other for copyright infringement110 before suddenly agreeing in March 2012 to merge in response to
severe business model challenges that included the soaring cost of exclusive copyright licenses.111
What factors led to the unprecedented turnaround? In a market in
which copyright enforcement is lax, competition for viewers and advertisers is fierce, costs are high (particularly for broadband fees), and revenues are modest, sites like Youku and Tudou presumably have little
103. See Loretta Chao, Top China Video Site Steps Up Its Piracy Fight, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487037575045751937
414615189.42. Unsurprisingly, the sites also use the technology as a censorship tool to help
identify and remove politically verboten video content. Id.
104. Wang Fei’er, supra note 98.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Aaron Back & Loretta Chao, China’s Youku Sues Rival Video Site Tudou,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204553904577
101914136777678.html.
111. Kathrin Hille, Youku and Tudou to Merge Amid Cost Rises, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/27d4df96-6c2f-11e1-8c9d-00144feab49a.html#axzz
1zythO5or (“The agreement [between Youku and Tudou to merge] comes as both companies are struggling with continuing losses because the cost of acquiring and producing content, and beefing up their infrastructure to ensure faster streaming speeds is outpacing the
increase in advertising revenue.”).
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incentive to police themselves for copyright violations. After all, doing so
increases their costs enormously (in the form of expensive content licenses, fees for video fingerprinting software, and administrative overhead associated with policing the site and managing licensed content)
while limiting their available programming to licensed content only,
thereby potentially diminishing their ability to attract and retain viewers.
The explanation, according to news reports and this Author’s interviews with Youku and Tudou executives, is that at least some of the advertisers the major video sharing sites covet most—large, transnational
consumer products companies such as Coca-Cola, McDonalds, PepsiCo,
KFC, Sony, and General Motors—grew uncomfortable advertising on
sites perceived to be havens for piracy.112 Several Chinese video websites,
since at least 2008, have collaborated directly with major international
brands as advertising clients.113 The specific impetus for the brands’ discomfort with associations with pirate sites appears to have been lawsuits
filed in Beijing in 2009 against two high-profile advertisers—The CocaCola Company and PepsiCo—who were named as contributory copyright
infringers for placing advertisements on Youku that accompanied unli112. Interview with Executive, Youku.com Inc., in Beijing, China (Sept. 14, 2011); Interview with Robin Wang, Senior PR Assoc., Tudou, in Beijing, China (Sept. 14, 2011);
Chao, supra note 103 (“Youku is betting the new fingerprint system will help it improve its
reputation among advertisers who don’t want to be associated with piracy. That association
can be risky. Last year, an antipiracy group of Chinese Internet companies filed a number
of lawsuits against Youku in Chinese courts, including one that alleged that a Coca-Cola
Co. ad had run on Youku accompanying a clip from a Chinese TV show that Youku hadn’t
licensed.”); Two Anti-Piracy Alliances, Same Enemy, CHINA INTELL. PROP. (Li Yu trans.,
Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=532 (describing
the deliberate efforts of copyright owners to include major advertising firms in their antipiracy alliance, to increase awareness of the piracy issue among advertisers, and to pressure
major brands);
[Brand Advertisers Disappear from Youku’s
Website], JISHINET (Sept. 27, 2009), http://it.sohu.com/20090927/n267036711.shtml
(describing the apparent sudden removal of major brand advertising from Youku, and reporting speculation that the removal was due to pressure from brands concerned about
piracy);
, [Coca-Cola Announces It Will Remove
Advertising from Illegal Sites],
[NETEASE FIN. & ECON.] (Sept. 24, 2009), http://
money.163.com/09/0924/18/5K0EL5MJ002526O3.html (reporting that The Coca-Cola
Company was sued as a contributory infringer for placing ads on an unlicensed television
drama on Youku, that suing advertisers has become a major focus of video copyright owners’ anti-piracy efforts in China, and that Coca-Cola publicly announced in China that it
will remove ads from any website that it confirms hosts illegal content);
[Luo Tian],”
Copyright Infringement Lawsuit Forces Advertisers to Withdraw from Websites],
[BEIJING BUS. NEWS] (Sept. 18, 2009), http://
www.techweb.com.cn/business/2009-09-18/440505.shtml (noting that China’s Association
of Accredited Advertising Agencies sent a warning letter about infringing websites to its
forty-one members, which account for eighty percent of ads purchased in China, and that
the exodus of advertisers threatens the survival of China’s online video websites);
[Advertisers Gradually Turn Down Video Sharing
Sites Hosting Unlicensed Content], XINHUANET (Aug. 31, 2009), http://news.sohu.com/
20090831/n266287368.shtml (discussing major brands’ serious concerns about advertising
on video sharing websites that host pirated content, in particular their concerns about the
deleterious effects on brand credibility, and concerns that pirate websites attract a high
volume of “junk” traffic that is of low value to brands) [hereinafter Advertisers Gradually
Turn Down Video Sharing Site Hosting Unlicensed Content].
113. See Loretta Chao, Online Advertising Gets Boost in China, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11,
2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122893812034095363.
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censed videos.114 Sohu, one of China’s major online portals and search
engines, began investing heavily in its online video streaming services after witnessing the success of sites such as Youku and Tudou.115 After unsuccessfully defending its own lawsuit in 2007 for hosting unlicensed
Hollywood movie downloads through a subsidiary,116 Sohu began to license legitimate content. Sohu CEO Charles Zhang, one of China’s
wealthiest and most influential Internet pioneers, reportedly grew convinced that the only way to build a successful video streaming business is
through licensing content.117 Zhang recognized, however, that building
such a business is impossible if the industry-wide norms persist and one
legitimate site is forced to compete with sites serving unlicensed content.118 In 2009, Sohu allied with two small video websites and more than
fifty video rights holders to sue infringing websites and pressure their
advertisers.119
There was little reason for a company such as Coca-Cola to worry
about the legal outcome in that case. The damages sought were relatively
low (reportedly about $100,000),120 and the damages awarded had the
plaintiffs been successful almost certainly would have been a fraction of
that amount.121 Legal experts doubted the likelihood of success in any
event,122 and the Beijing court dismissed the allegations against CocaCola.123 Nevertheless, it seems these lawsuits made the issue of association with pirated content real and immediate for brand owners. The advertisers are themselves owners of extremely valuable IP that they
114. See Wang Xing, Web Video Piracy War Heats Up, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bw/2009-09/28/content_8744294.htm#_jmp0; Two AntiPiracy Alliances, Same Enemy, supra note 112.
115. See Wang Xing, supra note 114.
116. Sarah Novotny, Beijing Slams Sohu for Posting U.S. Movies Online, ADOTAS (Jan.
2, 2007), http://www.adotas.com/2007/01/beijing-slams-sohu-for-posting-us-movies-online/.
117. See Marika Heller, Charles Zhang Regales IR/PS with Battle Stories from China’s
Internet Wars, CHINA FOCUS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://chinafocus.us/2014/02/14/charles-zhangregales-irps-battle-stories-chinas-internet-wars/.
118. See Clifford Coonan & Patrick Brzeski, Chinese Film, Internet Video Companies
Sue Search Giant Baidu in Anti-Piracy Push, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/chinese-film-internet-video-companies-655605#_jmp0_
(quoting Charles Zhang as saying, “We cannot keep competing because where thieves and
robbers are having their way, law-abiding companies cannot survive.”).
119. See Two Anti-Piracy Alliances, Same Enemy, supra note 112.
120. See Wang Xing, supra note 114 (noting that “[t]he lawsuit [was] seeking 686,386
yuan in compensation from Coca Cola and Youku.com”).
121. In a 2009 study of damages claimed and awarded in fifty-four civil copyright suits
in China, which included several cases involving major Western film studios and record
labels as plaintiffs, the median copyright damages claimed was $251,313, but the median
damages awarded amounted to $20,607—a mere 9 percent of median damages claimed.
KRISTINA SEPETYS & ALAN COX, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CHINA: TRENDS IN LITIGATION AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES 13
(2009), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/PUB_IPR_Protec
tion_China_0109_final.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Announces It Will Remove Advertising from Illegal Sites, supra
note 112 (reporting legal commentator’s opinion at the time of the litigation that the
grounds for holding Coca-Cola liable were insufficient); Wang Xing, supra note 114.
123. Chao, supra note 103.
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diligently defend against infringement in China and worldwide.124 It
would be hypocritical and arguably contravene company ethics and policy125 to advertise with and thereby support Web companies that profit
from the unauthorized use of others’ IP.126 For companies such as Youku
and Tudou, already unable to generate sufficient advertising revenue to
break even, losing the support of deep-pocketed international brands was
simply not an option.
2. Why Alternative Explanations of China’s Internet Video Licensing
Bubble Fall Short
How can we be sure that pressuring advertisers to police the video
sites’ content was the primary impetus for the change? After all, there are
at least four plausible alternative explanations. First, perhaps copyright
enforcement was working: the websites might have begun purging pirated
content in earnest because they feared (or grew weary of) copyright lawsuits over unlicensed videos. Second, the Chinese government might have
successfully pressured online video websites to cease infringement. Third,
both Youku and Tudou began concertedly removing pirated content and
seeking licenses just one or two years prior to their initial public offerings
on U.S. stock exchanges; perhaps the turnaround was designed to impress
Western investors. Fourth, perhaps Chinese online video sites determined
that in order to expand their business models and provide premium payper-view services, they needed content licenses. While all of these probably played a role in facilitating the change, the remainder of this Section
argues that none satisfies as the primary explanation. Nevertheless, it is
important to note preliminarily that even if the third reason (concern
about investor perceptions) and fourth reason (business model shift)
weighed prominently in the video websites’ change of heart, these are
also market-driven pressures that support this Article’s general thesis that
such pressures can be effective levers for attaining copyright compliance.

124. See, e.g., Emma Barraclough, How Coca-Cola Protects Its Rights in Asia, MANAGINTELL. PROP. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.managingip.com/Article/1450469/How-CocaCola-protects-its-rights-in-Asia.html (observing that Coca-Cola’s legal team deals with
“many hundreds of counterfeits and infringements” each year).
125. Many large transnational companies have policies mandating respect for intellectual property rights of others. See, e.g., SONY CORP., SONY GROUP CODE OF CONDUCT 6
(2014), http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/compliance/code_of_conduct.pdf (“In addition to vigorously defending Sony Group’s own rights, it is imperative to respect the
rights of others. Personnel must not knowingly misuse the intellectual property of others or
violate their intellectual property rights.”); MCDONALD’S CORP., STANDARDS OF BUSINESS
CONDUCT 38 (2011), http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/dam/AboutMcDonalds/In
vestors/9497_SBC_International_EN-US%20v2%20final%20061311.pdf (instructing employees to “[r]espect the proprietary rights of others, including patents, copyrights and
trademarks”).
126. Advertisers have grown increasingly sensitive in recent years to the potentially
brand-tarnishing effects of appearing to support copyright infringement on the Web. See
infra Part IV.C.2.
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a. Copyright Enforcement
Did lawsuits by copyright owners take their toll, forcing Youku and
Tudou to tire of the expense and hassle of copyright litigation, which became a fact of life for them as sites rife with unlicensed videos?127 While
the lawsuits were doubtless unwelcome and tiresome, concern about copyright litigation alone is inadequate to explain Tudou and Youku’s change
of heart. Given the generally low damages for infringement available
under Chinese copyright law, litigation efforts provided little deterrence.128 Other major Chinese sites, such as Baidu, China’s largest search
engine, have thrived in the face of persistent copyright litigation.129
b. Official Pressure
Alternatively, some commentators suggest that increased pressure
from Chinese authorities was a significant catalyst for Youku and Tudou’s
expeditious about-face on copyright compliance.130 Internet video providers have predictably drawn the attention and scrutiny of Chinese authorities. A cornerstone of authoritarian rule in China is strict media
control, and audiovisual works are regulated as a potent ideological medium.131 Various agencies have issued directives concerning the online
video market. Most have been issued by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), which regulates and supervises radio,
127. See Wang Xing, supra note 114.
128. Civil damages for copyright infringement are limited to the actual damages incurred by the right holder, or, where actual damages are difficult to compute, the plaintiff
can recover the “illegal income” of the infringer. Where neither the plaintiff’s actual damages nor the infringer’s illegal income are ascertainable, the court can impose statutory
damages of no greater than 500,000 RMB (approximately $79,000 USD). Art. 49,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuo Quanfa (
) [Copyright
Law of the People’s Rep. of China] (revised by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Feb. 26, 2010) P.R.C. LAWS. From 2006 to 2009, the average damage award for copyright
infringement was 32,051 RMB (approximately $5,000 USD). Priest, supra note 3, at 477. In
one example in the online media space, Baidu, which is China’s largest search engine and a
frequent copyright defendant, was found liable for infringing music copyrights by displaying lyrics without copyright owners’ permission. Id. at 478. The court entered a judgment of
60,000 RMB ($8,800 USD) against Baidu. Id.
129. See id. at 496–98.
130. See, e.g., Stan Abrams, China’s Video File Sharing Sites and the Drop in IP Infringement: Who’s Responsible?, CHINA HEARSAY (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.chinahearsay.com/chinas-video-file-sharing-sites-and-the-drop-in-ip-infringement-whos-responsible/;
see also Richard Wigley, China’s Online Video Providers Struck by PRC Copyright Enforcement and a Shifting Market Are Forced to Transform, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Jan. 30,
2011), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/01/articles/intellectual-property/chinas-onlinevideo-providers-struck-by-prc-copyright-enforcement-and-a-shifting-market-are-forced-totransform/ (concluding that Chinese video websites’ increased compliance with copyright
law is explained in part by the sites’ recognition that authorized content creates more monetization opportunities, but also by the “[r]ecent efforts by the National Copyright Administration (‘NCA’) to identify and, if necessary, punish online copyright infringers related to
pirated video works have shown the potential for meaningful results, with a number of
links to pirated works already having been deleted”).
131. Rogier Creemers, Explaining Audiovisual Media Piracy in China: Media Control,
Enforcement and Globalization 91–92 (2012) (unpublished dissertation, Maastricht Univ.)
(on file with Maastricht Univ.).
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film, and television production and broadcasting.132 As early as 2000,
SARFT promulgated provisional regulations on online broadcast of film
and television programs, which, among other things, established a permit
requirement for entities engaged in disseminating audiovisual works on
the Internet.133 Subsequent SARFT rules and regulations reiterate the
permit requirement and add that permit applicants must be wholly stateowned enterprises, and must already possess a television broadcast or
news license.134 These rules, like most SARFT rules concerning online
video dissemination, are primarily aimed at reinforcing the government’s
censorship power and media control.
Nevertheless, there is little reason to conclude that government pressure played a major role in Youku and Tudou’s turnaround on the piracy
issue. While SARFT has occasionally made life uncomfortable for sites
such as Youku and Tudou,135 it has allowed them to skirt various rules for
years. Youku and Tudou are foreign-invested, private enterprises that operated for years without a SARFT online video permit.136 (As noted
above, in 2012 Youku and Tudou merged.137) Although both companies
later acquired SARFT permits,138 neither actually holds the permit. Both
132. See DIMITROV, supra note 33, at 129. In 2013, SARFT merged with the General
Administration of Press and Publication to form the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television.
133. Art. 5, Xinxi Wangluo Zhuanbo Guangbo Dianying Dianshi Leijie Mujiandu
Guanli Zanxing Banfa Guangfa Shezi
(
) [Provisional Information
Network Dissemination of Radio, Film and Television-Type Program Supervision Management Rules] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, Apr. 7,
2000), translated in CHINA COPY. & MEDIA, http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.
com/2000/04/07/provisional-information-network-dissemination-of-radio-film-and-televi
sion-type-programme-supervision-management-rules/ (“The State Administration of Radio, Film and Television implements a permit system over dissemination of radio, film and
television-type programmes through information networks. Only when holding an ‘Online
Dissemination of Radio, Film and Television-Type Programmes Permit’, is it permitted to
launch dissemination of radio, film and television-type programmes through information
networks work.”).
134. Arts. 6–8, Hulianwang Shiting Jiemu Fuwu Guanli Guiding
(
) [Internet Audiovisual Program Service Management Regulations] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, Dec. 20, 2007,
effective Jan. 30, 2008), translated in CHINA COPY. & MEDIA, http://chinacopyrightandme
dia.wordpress.com/2007/12/20/internet-audiovisual-programme-service-management-regu
lations/.
135. See Jeremy Goldkorn, Video Website Licenses for 247 Sites; Big Three Left in the
Cold, DANWEI (June 23, 2008, 12:05 AM), http://www.danwei.org/media_regulation/video_
website_licenses_247_sit.php (“SARFT has published a list of 247 organizations that are
‘approved to host Internet audio-visual programs’ in China. . . . But conspicuously missing
from the list are the Big Three of the Chinese Youtube clones: Youku.com, Tudou.com and
56.com. Although 56.com has been off line for nearly two weeks after an apparent porblem
[sic] with the authorities, these three websites have the largest amount of funding of any
video websites in China, most of it foreign. By most accounts they are also the most popular video sites in China.”).
136. Tudou Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 at
30 (Form F-1) (June 16, 2011) [hereinafter Tudou SEC Registration Statement].
137. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
138. Steven Schwankert, China Approves Video Site Youku’s License, CIO (July 10,
2008, 8:00 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/430513/China_Approves_Video_Site_Youku
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Youku and Tudou were incorporated in the Cayman Islands and are publicly traded in the United States.139 As foreign-invested enterprises, they
are forbidden from holding such permits. The permits are therefore held
by “affiliated entities” in China (in what is typically referred to as a Variable Interest Entity—or VIE—corporate structure) with which Youku and
Tudou have contractual arrangements.140 In addition, Youku and Tudou
have long been streaming foreign films and television programs in violation of SARFT regulations that prohibit the dissemination of foreign content that has not been approved for public screening.141
Some SARFT rules and regulations concerning Internet video do reference copyright law, vaguely directing providers of online audiovisual
works to abide by copyright law and adopt “copyright protection measures.”142 Nevertheless, SARFT rules and regulations primarily concern
_s_License (Youku obtained its SARFT license in September 2008); Tudou SEC Registration Statement, supra note 136.
139. Youku.com Inc., Prospectus (Form 424(B)(4)) (Dec. 8, 2010) [hereinafter
Youku.com Inc.]; Tudou SEC Registration Statement, supra note 136.
140. Youku.com Inc., supra note 139, at 5; Tudou SEC Registration Statement, supra
note 136, at 6. This structure, in which a foreign entity establishes an independent, privately-owned local operational entity, is known as the “Variable Interest Entity” (VIE)
corporate structure. See T.K. Chang, Retail Sector and E-Commerce, in DOING BUSINESS IN
CHINA § 7.09[3] (Michael J. Moser & Fu Yu eds., Release 25, 2014). The off-shore company holds no equity in the local entity, which is typically owned by a trusted Chinese
national (for example, Youku’s primary “affiliated entity” is jointly owned by Youku’s
CFO and the wife of the company’s founder). Youku.com Inc., supra note 139, at 5. In the
VIE structure, control of the local company and acquisition of its profits are achieved
through a series of contractual agreements. Chang, supra, § 709[3]. While this structure is
well established in China and to date has been accepted by Chinese authorities, the legality
of the VIE structure remains an open question. See Joy Shaw & Lisa Chow, China VIE
Structure May Hold Hidden Risks, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/2/0a1e4d78-0bf6-11e1-9310-00144feabdc0.html#axzz20LTC20TN (quoting a Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) official as saying “‘Currently MOFCOM still doesn’t require all
the VIE companies to notify their ongoing M&A deals with MOFCOM under the foreign
investment policy. But VIE companies should be aware that MOFCOM has the right to
retrospectively (investigate) historical deals,’” and reporting that “the lack of consensus on
VIE partly reflects ongoing power struggles among various regulatory agencies, which all
seek to expand regulatory authority”).
141. See Steve Dickinson & Mathew Alderson, China’s Film Industry Promotion Law.
How Do Tudou/Yokou Investors Sleep At Night?, CHINA L. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2012), http://
www.chinalawblog.com/2012/04/chinas-film-industry-promotion-law-how-do-tudouyokouinvestors-sleep-at-night.html.
142. See, e.g., Art. 5, Guangdianzongju Guanyu Jiaqiang Hulianwang Shiting Jiemu
Neirong Guanli De Tongzhi (
) [SARFT
Notice Concerning Strengthening Internet Audiovisual Programme Content Management]
(promulgated by the State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, Mar. 3, 2009) translated
in CHINA COPY. & MEDIA, http://www.Chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2009/03/
03/sarft-notice-concerning-strenghhtening-internet-audiovisual-progamme-content-man
agement-2/ (“Work units engaging in Internet audiovisual programme service must perfect
a programme copyright protection system, strictly respect the provisions of copyright laws
and administrative regulations, the disseminated programmes shall possess corresponding
copyright. They must adopt copyright protection measures, protect the lawful rights and
interests of copyright holders. All localities’ radio, film and television management entities
must administer according to the law, scrupulously perform their duties, realistically
strengthen Internet audiovisual programme content management, supervise and urge the
audiovisual programme websites to implement this diligently, consciously observe the
above provisions, vigorously make effort to construct a harmonious, green network audio-
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its powers of media control for purposes of political and social control
(including blocking the dissemination of pornography, horror, and other
genres that might not be politically sensitive but are believed to endanger
the moral character of Chinese society).143 Ensuring compliance with
copyright law, while presumably a worthwhile aspiration in the view of
SARFT officials, ranks at best a distant third behind controlling politically and culturally sensitive media. All of this is to say that if SARFT
pressures online video sites, doing so on copyright enforcement grounds
is unlikely given the other plausible grounds for claiming noncompliance
that are more relevant to SARFT’s mandate. While copyright and censorship are sometimes bedfellows in China, all the evidence suggests SARFT
is far more concerned about the latter than the former. It is quite possible
that Youku and Tudou’s swift installation of their content ID systems was
driven at least in part, and possibly in large part, by government pressure
to provide more effective and responsive political and social content filtering. Once such content ID technologies were in place, utilizing them to
police copyright infringement was an obvious and opportune deployment.
The primary agency tasked with copyright enforcement, the National
Copyright Administration (NCA), has held annual campaigns aimed at
reducing online piracy since 2005.144 In 2010, the NCA initiated an antipiracy campaign against online video infringers.145 The long-term effect
of the latest campaign is unclear, but it is worth noting that the NCA is a
comparatively weak agency due to its low bureaucratic status and the fact
that it historically engages in short-term enforcement campaigns that
have little lasting effect.146 It appears these recent online enforcement
efforts follow the NCA’s traditional campaign-style enforcement
model.147 In any event, the NCA began its online crackdown efforts in
earnest well after Youku and Tudou had already taken steps to substanvisual programme environment.”); Art. 15, Hulianwang Shiting Jiemu Fuwu Guanli
Guiding (
) [Internet Audiovisual Programme Service Management Regulations] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television,
Dec. 20, 2007, effective Jan. 30, 2008), translated in CHINA COPY. & MEDIA, http://china
copyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2007/12/20/internet-audiovisual-programme-servicemanagement-regulations/ (“Internet audiovisual programme service work units shall abide
the provisions of copyright laws and administrative regulations, adopt copyright protection
measures, protect the lawful rights and interests of copyright holders.”); Art. 18, Hulianwang Deng Xinxi Wangluo Chuanbo Shiting Jiemu Guanli Banfa Di Yi Zhang Zongze
(
) [Internet and Other Information
Networks Audiovisual Programme Dissemination Management Rules] (promulgated by
the State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, July 6, 2004, effective Oct. 11, 2004),
translated in CHINA COPY. & MEDIA, http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2004/
07/06/internet-and-other-information-networks-audiovisual-programme-disseminationmanagement-rules/ (“Audiovisual programmes disseminated through information networks, shall conform to the provisions of the ‘Copyright Law.’”).
143. See Priest, supra note 3, at 482–83, 488–95.
144. See Youku.com Inc., supra note 139, at 135.
145. See Bo Qiu, Blacklist System to Monitor Online Video Copyright, CHINA DAILY
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/life/2011-01/29/content_11939475.htm.
146. DIMITROV, supra note 33, at 234–35.
147. See Bo Qiu, supra note 145.
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tially reduce their unlicensed content.148 Accordingly, it is unlikely that
the NCA’s efforts led to the turnaround, at least in the case of Youku and
Tudou. An executive at Youku confirmed this, telling this Author that
government pressure was “not a major issue” in Youku’s decision to remove copyrighted material and implement a content identification system
to help thwart infringement.149
c. Reputational Concerns Ahead of Planned IPOs
Some argue that the major video sites’ sudden about-face on online
video copyright compliance was motivated by a desire to burnish their
reputations ahead of their public stock offerings in the United States.150
According to this theory, Chinese theft of American IP is an inflammatory topic in the United States, and American investors will lack confidence in a company widely perceived as a Chinese copyright pirate. The
risk of copyright litigation might make investors leery. Sites such as
Youku and Tudou had no choice, therefore, but to clean up their acts preIPO.151
This is the most plausible alternative explanation among the four explored here, and to the extent that reputational concerns played a role in
the websites’ anti-infringement efforts it provides further evidence that
market pressures may be more effective than traditional legal enforcement in challenging environments. Nevertheless, reputational concerns
pre-IPO do not appear to have been as important a factor as advertiser
relations. First, it is not clear that IP liability of Chinese websites ranked
highly among the concerns of U.S. investors in 2009. Up to that point,
accusations of piracy or the existence of copyright litigation had little negative effect on the performance of a Chinese Internet company’s stock in
the U.S. market. For example, Baidu’s initial public offering on NASDAQ in 2005 created “the IPO market’s biggest splash in at least five
years,”152 despite that Baidu was already dogged by copyright infringement lawsuits.153 Baidu’s stock price continued to soar notwithstanding a
rash of copyright suits filed by domestic Chinese and major international
148. See Chao, supra note 103 (noting in early 2010 that Youku and Tudou were already
well along in implementing a video fingerprinting system to reduce piracy).
149. Interview with Executive, Youku.com Inc., supra note 112.
150. See, e.g., Li Chen, Chinese Video Sites Spend Big to Keep Audience Attention,
TECHINASIA (June 24, 2011), http://www.techinasia.com/china-video-spend-money/
(“There’s a recent trend among video websites in China to spend enormous amounts of
money to acquire TV and movie content. In the past, such content was usually streamed
without license, and as a result many Chinese video sites became wildly popular when they
first started. But now that many of them have IPO’d (or intend to IPO) they are trying to
go legit with licensed content.”).
151. See id.
152. See Steve Gelsi, Baidu.com More Than Triples, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 5, 2005),
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2005-08-05/news/30696294_1_ipo-market-ipo-price-baiducom.
153. See Jeremy Goldkorn, Baidu IPO: Investors Go Nuts But Doubts Remain, DANWEI
(Aug. 8, 2005, 1:13 PM), http://www.danwei.org/business_and_finance/baidu_ipo_investors
_go_nuts_bu.php (“Baidu’s Google-glow enchanted investors[’] enthusiasm was not dampened in the slightest by an IPR infringement suit brought against the Chinese search engine
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record labels alike, alleging that Baidu’s MP3 search function willfully
enabled mass copyright infringement.154 In April 2008, the Chairman of
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the industry association representing the four international major record labels
at the time (Universal Music, Sony Music, EMI, and Warner Music), publicly singled out Baidu as “China’s largest violator of music copyrights,
generating huge revenue by deliberately providing access to illegal content.”155 Nevertheless, Baidu’s stock price enjoyed a 20 percent increase
in the thirty days following Kennedy’s statement.156 Sohu.com, another
major Chinese Web portal also publicly traded in the United States, had
been a defendant in high-profile lawsuits by the IFPI157 and the Motion
Picture Association prior to 2009,158 but there is little indication this affected its stock price or reputation among investors.
In addition, online video sites could generally comply with notice and
takedown procedures and thereby reduce their litigation risk.159 Simple
compliance with notice and takedown procedures would likely be sufficient to mollify investors on the risks of infringement litigation, particularly in the U.S. market, which seems quite forgiving on this point, and
by the producers of Zhang Yimou’s film House of Flying Daggers, reported by Bloomberg
just days before the IPO.”).
154. See Priest, supra note 3, at 496–98.
155. Baidu Faces Potential Multi-Billion Dollar Liability for Breaching Music Copyrights, MUSIC INDUS. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.mi2n.com/press.php3?
press_nb=108736 (quoting IFPI Chairman John Kennedy).
156. Baidu, Inc. (BIDU) Historical Prices, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=BIDU&a=03&b=1&c=2008&d=04&e=30&f=2008&g=d (showing that Baidu’s stock
price rose from $30.00 on April 7, 2007 to $35.91 on May 7, 2007).
157. See Jason Mick, IFPI, Warner, Universal, Sony Attack Baidu, Yahoo, Sohu for
Copyright Infringement, DAILY TECH (Feb. 6, 2008, 6:10 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/IF
PI+Warner+Universal+Sony+Attack+Baidu+Yahoo+Sohu+For+Copyright+Infringement/
article10585.htm.
158. See Liz Shackelton, Chinese Fine Sohu and Shanghai Store for Copyright Infringement, SCREEN DAILY (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.screendaily.com/chinese-fine-sohu-andshanghai-store-for-copyright-infringement/4030039.article.
159. See Priest, supra note 3, at 474–75. A website enjoys a safe harbor from copyright
liability if it: (1) clearly indicates that it provides its storage space to subscribers, (2) does
not alter the works in question, (3) has no knowledge of or reasonable grounds for knowing of the infringing act, (4) does not seek to financially benefit directly from the works,
and (5) expeditiously removes the content after receipt of the notice. Xinxi Wangluo
Chuanbo Baohu Quan Tiaoli (
) [Regulations for the Protection
of the Right of Communication Through the Information Network] (promulgated by the
St. Council, May 10, 2006, effective July 1, 2006) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Jul. 10, 2006, at 13
(China), translated in 3 CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARKS 90, 93–94 (2006). The 2012 second
revision draft of the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that a
network service provider that fails to expeditiously remove or otherwise disable access to
infringing content on its service “bear[s] joint and several liability with the [direct] infringer.” Art 69, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuo Quanfa (Xiugai Caoan Di Er
Gao) (
) [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (Second Revision Draft)] (promulgated by the Nat’l Copyright Admin.,
Mar. 31, 2012, effective Jul. 31, 2012 Westlaw China). Indeed, the safe harbor regulations
and procedures in China seem to particularly favor online service providers. Copyright
owners and their representatives report the notice and takedown procedures are opaque,
non-standardized, and burdensome on copyright owners, including high proof thresholds
for establishing ownership. Priest, supra note 3, at 475.
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millions spent on content licenses would be unnecessary. In an interview,
a Youku executive confirmed this conclusion, telling this Author that the
company was well along in reforming its approach to copyright before it
had even decided to become a public company.160
d. Business Model Transition
Lastly, some observers suggest that major video sites such as Youku
and Tudou were motivated to improve copyright compliance because
they envision transitioning to subscription and on-demand, pay-per-view
content delivery as their next-generation business model.161 Successfully
employing these models long term would require these companies to acquire licenses and establish a good rapport with copyright owners. The
major video sites rely almost exclusively on advertising revenue, and at
the time of this writing they have never been profitable doing so.162 Both
sites do indeed, therefore, hope subscription and pay-per-view offerings
will become an important piece of their monetization puzzle.163 It seems
impossible to maximize the value of such offerings without the consent
and cooperation of content owners. At the very least, placing content behind a pay wall would disqualify online video service providers from
utilizing the legal safe harbor for hosting content posted at the direction
of a user.164
This argument is premised on the idea that market conditions may
force infringers into compliance even when legal sanctions are insufficient. To the extent that this was a motivating factor, therefore, it buttresses the argument that market pressures can be highly effective
enforcement tools. However, it also appears not to have been the primary
reason for the shift—mostly because the pressure to shift business models
was far less than the pressure to maintain and increase ad revenue. Payper-view and subscription services are highly speculative and have generated modest revenue.165 It is doubtful that a company such as Youku,
160. Interview with Executive, Youku.com Inc., supra note 112.
161. See Wigley, supra note 130 (“Beyond today’s model for monetization of online
video in China, which is largely based on advertising revenues, there is a new and potentially huge market for paid downloads/streams of desirable content. In December of 2010,
Youku.com began streaming the movie, ‘Inception’, at a cost to users of [5] RMB (approximately 75 U.S. cents), based upon a licensing deal between Youku.com and Warner
Bros.”).
162. See Watch This Space, supra note 95.
163. See Barboza, supra note 97 (observing that Tudou claims to be “positioning itself
as a Chinese version of HBO”); Einhorn, supra note 96 (quoting Youku founder and CEO,
Victor Koo, as saying “You can’t build a business out of [unauthorized downloads]. If you
can’t monetize it, what’s the point?”).
164. See supra note 159.
165. According to Youku’s investor documents, from 2007 to 2010 the company’s nonadvertising revenue “accounted for nil.” See Youku.com Inc., supra note 139, at 75–76. In
2012, non-advertising revenue, including pay-per-view and subscription services, accounted
for approximately $29 million of Youku’s revenue, a substantial jump from previous years
but still a modest 10 percent of 2012’s total net revenue of $288,210, mostly derived from
advertising. See YOUKU TUDOU INC., FORM 20-F: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SEC-
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with mounting losses and a desperate need to show profitability,166 would
invest $170 million in content licensing fees—as it did from 2010 to
2012—to grow speculative services that earn a small fraction of those
expenditures.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, market pressures in the nature of coercing advertisers played the most prominent role in Chinese
Internet video sites’ rebirth as copyright adherents. This case study shows
that in markets where copyright law enforcement is weak and piracy is
the norm, one can achieve a shift to copyright-friendly norms through an
indirect, market-pressure enforcement strategy. Importantly, it also
shows that once this shift has occurred, the erstwhile pirate who now invests in content acquisition becomes more than just a licensee and revenue source; it becomes a stakeholder in the copyright ecosystem. After
all, substantial investments in content acquisition provide little value if
competitors continue to serve the same content without incurring the licensing costs. Indeed, pressuring third parties—in this case advertisers—
caused those third parties to become indirect stakeholders in the copyright ecosystem as well. By using market pressures to increase the size of
the copyright ecosystem and the number of its stakeholders, audiovisual
copyright owners were able to ensure far greater, ongoing adherence to
copyright law than they could have through direct legal enforcement of
their rights. While the online video sites still have to prove their model,
and piracy within the online video industry remains a threat, the marketpressure strategy has already paid enormous dividends to copyright
owners.
B. PRESSURING OVERSEAS MANUFACTURERS
COMPETITION LAWS

THROUGH

U.S. UNFAIR

The second case study involves efforts by U.S. software copyright owners to address the widespread use of unlicensed enterprise software overseas. According to a 2012 study by the Business Software Alliance (BSA),
the commercial value of unlicensed PC software use worldwide exceeds
$63 billion annually.167 Much of this commercial value derives from the
widespread use of unlicensed enterprise software: among all computer
users in the BSA study who self-reported unlicensed software use, busi12 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2012 (Apr. 26, 2013).
166. See Doug Young, Big Investors Lose Taste for Pactera, Youku, SEEKINGALPHA.COM (Sept. 16, 2013), http://seekingalpha.com/article/1696572-big-investors-losetaste-for-pactera-youku?source=email_rt_mc_focus_0 (noting that one large institutional
investor had divested its stake in Youku in part because “Youku Tudou is losing money and
has given no indication of when it might become profitable” and that “CEO Victor Koo
desperately wants to show the world he can make Youku Tudou into a profitable
company”).
167. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SHADOW MARKET: 2011 BSA GLOBAL
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2012), available at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011/downloads/
study_pdf/2011_BSA_Piracy_Study-Standard.pdf [hereinafter 2011 BSA GLOBAL
SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY].
TION
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ness decision-makers ranked first.168 The use of unlicensed business
software in emerging markets is especially prevalent, as the BSA found
that business decision-makers in emerging markets were more likely than
their counterparts in mature markets to use unlicensed software.169 Many
emerging markets, which are characterized by their surging economies
but weak legal systems and poor property rights enforcement,170 have
piracy rates that far outstrip those of mature markets.171 Emerging markets with high estimated software piracy rates include Indonesia (where
an estimated 86 percent of all PC software in use is pirated), China (77
percent), Thailand (72 percent), India (63 percent), and Brazil (53 percent).172 While the piracy rates in each of these emerging markets except
Indonesia has actually fallen over the past decade, progress remains slow
and copyright owners’ ability to monetize software use in numerous
emerging markets lags far behind those markets’ economic development.
Microsoft’s experience in China is illustrative. In 1998, then-CEO Bill
Gates famously revealed that part of the company’s China strategy was to
ensure first and foremost the proliferation of Microsoft’s software products, even if at the time the majority of copies in China were unlicensed.173 The idea, he said, was to get Chinese users “sort of addicted”
to Microsoft’s products, and then Microsoft would “somehow figure out
how to collect sometime in the next decade.”174 He presumed that as
China’s economy and legal system develop, so too would the ability of,
and incentives for, users to pay for software. Nearly two decades following his remarks however, software producers’ ability to collect revenues
in China remains elusive.175 China’s software piracy rates are still among
the highest in the world, while its legitimate software sales in 2011
amounted to just 6 percent of those of the United States, despite China’s
far larger population.176
Some U.S. software producers allege that the immense copyright enforcement difficulties in emerging markets produce a galling inequity:
many businesses in emerging markets fail to pay software licensing fees to
U.S. copyright owners while those same businesses avail themselves of
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id.
170. YADONG LUO, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 5–6
(2002).
171. See 2011 BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 167, at 6.
172. Id. The study also estimates PC software piracy rates for many developed countries, including the United States (19 percent), Japan (21 percent), Australia (23 percent),
Germany (26 percent) and the United Kingdom (26 percent), and concludes that “[a]s a
group, [emerging markets’] piracy rate was 68 percent in 2011 compared to an average of
24 percent in developed economies.” Id.
173. Corey Grice & Sandeep Junnarkar, Gates, Buffett a Bit Bearish, CNET NEWS (July
2, 1998), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-212942.html (quoting Bill Gates’ remarks before
an audience at the University of Washington).
174. Id.
175. See Priest, supra note 3, at 529–30.
176. See 2011 BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 167, at 6.
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the economic opportunities afforded by access to U.S. markets.177 This,
copyright owners argue, harms not only software producers; it also harms
competition.178 Pervasive enterprise software piracy in emerging markets
has, in the BSA’s words, “broad ramifications, because software is an essential tool of production; companies that dodge the capital cost of it gain
an unfair competitive advantage over companies that pay for software as
they should.”179
Determined to seize the attention of manufacturers in markets where
copyright enforcement is weak, software copyright owners have urged
that it be an actionable act of unfair competition to sell goods in the
United States that were produced using unlicensed software.180 Unfair
competition law is a collection of tort doctrines aimed at remedying economic injuries to competing businesses that result from deceptive or unfair business practices.181 It is a novel and innovative expansion of the law
to hold businesses liable for anticompetitive effects of failing to purchase
software licenses, and questions persist about the approach’s legality,182
the normative desirability of expanding unfair competition law in this
manner, and the extent to which U.S.-based manufacturers are actually
injured by overseas competitors’ use of unlicensed software.183 What is
clear is that the idea found its inspiration in copyright owners’ attempts to
motivate large manufacturers to buy software licenses by establishing a
market-based pressure point—access to U.S. markets—when traditional
copyright enforcement measures fail.
The theory of copyright infringement as unfair competition is gaining
traction in the United States among commentators and officials.184 Law
professor Andrew Popper recently argued that, “If a manufacturer steals
software . . . instead of paying for it, its input costs are reduced as com177. See KERR & MOUTRAY, supra note 18, at 13; Arthur M. Mitchell III et al., The
Emerging Risks of Unauthorized IP in Your Supply Chain and How You Should Respond
– Part II, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 8–9 (2014) (describing Thai seafood processor
gaining an advantage in U.S. markets through its use of unlicensed software).
178. 2011 BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 167, at 3.
179. Id.
180. See Mitchell III et al., supra note 177, at 4; Sharon Pian Chan, Microsoft Presses
State to Tackle Software Piracy, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://seattle
times.com/html/businesstechnology/2014472018_btpiracy14.html.
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995).
182. For example, do U.S. federal copyright and patent laws preempt the application of
state unfair competition laws in this context? Is conditioning access to U.S. markets on the
use of licensed software preempted under U.S. foreign relations law? Does it constitute
impermissible discrimination under international trade law? For an analysis of these questions, see Sean A. Pager & Eric Priest, Infringement as Unfair Competition: A New Paradigm for Regulating Global Commerce (unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming 2016) (on
file with author).
183. For a discussion of the cost advantage justification, see David J. Kappos & Gregory
R. Baden, Combating IP Theft Using Unfair Competition Law, N.Y. L.J. (May 6, 2013),
available at http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3409818_1.pdf.
For a study attempting to quantify the general economic harms to U.S. manufacturers that
result from competitors’ use of pirated software, see generally KERR & MOUTRAY, supra
note 18, at 3–4.
184. See, e.g., id.; Popper, supra note 18, at 28–29; Kappos & Baden, supra note 183.
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pared to its competitors that pay for their IT. . . . The result is an uneven
playing field, rewarding theft and penalizing those who respect the rule of
law and pay for their information technology . . . .”185 In a 2014 study
titled “The Economic Impact of Global Software Theft on U.S. Manufacturing Competitiveness and Innovation,” Harvard Business School professor William Kerr and National Association of Manufacturers chief
economist Chad Moutray estimated that “[t]he unfair competitive advantage gained by overseas manufacturers from software theft cost manufacturers in the U.S. . . . $239.9 billion [in revenue between 2002–2012].”186
Former FTC chairman William Kovacic and former Director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office David Kappos have also
strongly advocated for the expanded application of unfair competition
law to penalize unlicensed software use by foreign manufacturers that sell
their products in the United States.187 In November 2011, attorneys general from thirty-six states and three U.S. territories sent a letter to the
commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) urging them to
use Section 5 of the FTC Act to address the unfair competition they allege results from selling goods in the United States that were produced
using “stolen” information technology, including unlicensed software.188
The expansion of unfair competition doctrine to address competitive
advantages arising from the use of pirated software is more than just a
theory. As the following subsections detail, five states have already taken
official action to penalize the sale of products for which the manufacturing process or supply chain utilized unlicensed software. Two of those
states (Washington State and Louisiana) have passed specialized legislation penalizing the sale within their jurisdictions of products that utilize

185. Popper, supra note 18, at 29.
186. KERR & MOUTRAY, supra note 18, at 10. Empirically justifying this theory by establishing the economic advantages exclusively attributable to pirated software use is a
challenge. In this study, commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) and the National Alliance for Jobs and Innovation, Kerr and Moutry attempt to
establish and quantify the cumulative economic impact of global software piracy on U.S.
manufacturers and the U.S. economy over a period of ten years. Id. They do so by estimating the size of the cost advantage firms around the world receive by using pirated software,
and then estimating the effect of that cost advantage on key indicators of the U.S. manufacturing sector’s competitiveness: revenue, GDP, and employment. Id. at 7. They conclude that in addition to the revenue loss to manufacturers, the U.S. GDP decreased by
$69.6 billion and the U.S. manufacturing sector lost 42,000 jobs as a result of global
software piracy. Id. at 4. The study’s methodology, whether or not it portrays an accurate
macro-level picture of the costs of global piracy to the U.S. manufacturing sector, provides
little guidance on the vexing question of how to quantify direct economic harms suffered
by a particular law-abiding U.S. manufacturer as a result of foreign competitors’ use of
infringing software. Ultimately, being able to quantify direct economic harm is key to establishing the actionable unfair conduct at the heart of this theory. (In the interest of full
disclosure, this Author is a member of the National Alliance for Jobs and Innovation board
of directors, but had no direct involvement in the coordination or drafting of this study.)
187. See Kappos & Baden, supra note 183; William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman,
Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 933, 937–39, 944 (2010).
188. Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., supra note 70.
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“stolen IT” in their production or distribution,189 and one of those statutes (Washington) has been invoked against a major Brazilian aircraft
manufacturer.190 Attorneys general in three other states (California, Massachusetts, and Tennessee) have invoked broadly worded, existing state
unfair competition laws against manufacturers in other countries for
utilizing unlicensed software.191
1. Specialized “Anti-IT Theft” State Unfair Competition Laws
a. Washington’s Statute
The Washington legislation plainly aims to pressure overseas manufacturers to purchase licensed software by effectively conditioning access to
the Washington market on the use of licensed software. To enhance its
effectiveness, the statute also incentivizes major U.S. companies to apply
direct economic pressure to manufacturers using pirated software. Titled
“Stolen or Misappropriated Information Technology,” the statute makes
it an act of unfair competition to sell or make available for sale in the
state any article or product manufactured “using stolen or misappropriated information technology in its business operations.”192 The statute
defines “stolen information technology” as “hardware or software . . .
acquired, appropriated, or used without the authorization of the owner
[or licensee] of the information technology . . . in violation of applicable
law.”193
The statute targets two types of business entity.194 First, it targets manufacturers of products that utilize stolen information technology at any
point in the product’s manufacture, distribution, marketing, or sale.195
Thus, manufacturers of many types of products—furniture, automobile
parts, electronics, and so on—are potentially liable if any computer used
in the manufacturing, shipping, distribution, or promotion of the product
ran an unauthorized copy of Windows, AutoCAD, Excel, or, in theory,
any other proprietary software program. The liable “manufacturer” is the
entity that directly produces or assembles an article; it does not include
an entity that outsources production.196 Thus, for example, a Chinese car
manufacturer could face potential damages and an injunction if it utilized
unlicensed software during the production of its automobiles, and the re189. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.330.020 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1427 (2014).
190. See Wash. Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 19.
191. See Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., supra note 19; Cal. Office of the Att’y Gen.,
supra note 19; ABA Panelists Report, supra note 19.
192. § 19.330.020.
193. § 19.330.0107(a).
194. See § 19.330.020; § 19.330.080.
195. See § 19.330.020.
196. See § 19.330.010(4) (“‘Manufacture’ means to directly manufacture, produce, or
assemble an article or product [made using stolen information technology], in whole or
substantial part, but does not include contracting with or otherwise engaging another person, or that person engaging another person, to develop, manufacture, produce, or assemble an article or product [made using stolen information technology].”).
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sulting automobiles were sold in Washington in competition with cars
produced using licensed software.197 Likewise, even a U.S.-based automobile manufacturer could face liability if overseas plants it owns and
controls used unlicensed software and the resulting automobiles were
then sold in Washington.
Second, the statute provides for secondary liability of “third parties”
that have a direct contractual relationship with the manufacturer, that
have annual revenue exceeding $50 million, and that sell products in the
state that were manufactured using stolen information technology.198
Large retailers such as Wal-Mart, Target, Walgreens, and Costco are potentially liable “third parties” under the statute and therefore could face
damages for selling a toaster, television, lamp, or other product manufactured at a plant that uses unlicensed copies of system software or design
or logistics applications on computers involved in manufacturing operations. Companies that outsource their product manufacturing, or
purchase components from a contract supplier, could also face secondary
liability if those products or components were manufactured using stolen
information technology and are sold in the state.199
Secondary liability arises under narrow conditions only.200 Nevertheless, the purpose of the secondary liability provisions is clear: induce U.S.based customers to police their supply chains. Indeed, a third party is
excused from liability if it demonstrates that it imposed on the manufacturer a written code of conduct that included commitments not to use
stolen information technology, or had written assurances from the manufacturer that the goods were manufactured without the use of stolen information technology.201
A manufacturer found liable may have sales of the affected products
enjoined in the state or be required to pay actual damages or statutory
damages (the latter being limited to the retail price of the stolen information technology).202
197. See § 19.330.060(1)(b)(i), (ii); § 19.330.040.
198. § 19.330.080(1)(b); § 19.330.080(e).
199. See § 19.330.060(2)(d). In addition, the sale of offending products by certain retailers in the state could be enjoined in in rem proceedings if the court does not have personal
jurisdiction over the manufacturer and if the manufacturer holds title to the goods.
§ 19.330.070.
200. In addition to the requirements noted above (the third party must have a direct
contractual relationship with the manufacturer and annual revenue exceeding $50 million),
a third party faces liability only if the manufacturer was sued first under the statute, the
manufacturer had a judgment entered against it, and the manufacturer either failed to
appear in court or had insufficient assets in the state. § 19.330.060(2)(a), (b), (d), (3).
201. § 19.330.080(1)(c)(i). Having such a code of conduct or written assurance alone,
however will not suffice. If a manufacturer is sued under the statute and loses, the third
party must, within 180 days, acquire proof from the manufacturer that it has ceased using
stolen information technology, demand that the manufacturer cease using the stolen information technology, or cease purchasing from the manufacturer altogether. Id.
(1)(c)(i)(A)–(C).
202. § 19.330.060(1)(b)(i), (ii), (3), (6)(a). Third parties’ damages are limited to the
lesser of the retail price of the stolen information technology or $250,000. Id. (3).
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A central feature of the statute is its notice and cure provision.203 As an
unfair competition law, the statute does not give the copyright owner the
right to bring an action directly against manufacturers.204 However,
neither the attorney general nor a competing manufacturer may bring an
action until the copyright holder notifies the defendant manufacturer in
writing based on a “reasonable and good faith investigation.”205 After the
defendant manufacturer receives notice, it has ninety days to rebut or
cure by establishing that it did not use stolen information technology or
that it ceased using the stolen information technology.206 In addition, the
notice and cure period may be extended an additional ninety days if the
defendant manufacturer takes steps toward ensuring that the unlicensed
information technology is replaced by licensed copies.207
The purpose behind the notice and cure provision is clear: pressure
overseas manufacturers to purchase licensed software, give them ample
opportunity to do so, and let them off the hook once they do. After receiving the software rightholder’s notice, all the defendant needs to do to
halt the proceedings is ensure that it (or, in the case of a liable third party,
its overseas supplier or manufacturing partner) has purchased software
licenses within six months.208
There are numerous broad exceptions built into the statute.209 Many of
the exceptions and safe harbors appear to have been negotiated by industries concerned about the breadth of the statute as originally conceived.
Even with the exceptions, however, the statute remains broad enough to
203. See § 19.330.060; § 19.330.050.
204. Such an action, if permitted, would raise federal copyright preemption issues, particularly if the copyright infringement occurred in the United States. Only the state attorney general or a competing manufacturer who did not use software unlawfully may bring
an action. § 19.330.060(1), (5). In order for a competing manufacturer to bring an action, it
must show that (1) it produces competing goods sold in Washington state, (2) its production of those goods did not benefit from the use of stolen information technology, and (3)
it suffered “economic harm” as a result of the competitor’s use of pirated software, which
can be demonstrated by showing that the alleged stolen information technology is valued
at $20,000 or more. Id. (5).
205. Id. The notice must identify the allegedly illegally used information technology
and the applicable law violated (for example, the copyright law of the overseas jurisdiction
where the unauthorized copying took place). Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See § 19.330.050(1).
209. For example, end consumers are exempt from liability, as are smaller retailers that
earn less than $50 million in annual revenues. See § 19.330.080. There are subject matter
exclusions, as well: the statute does not apply to services, including online and restaurant
services, pharmaceuticals, and food and beverages. See § 19.330.010(1). The statute also
seeks to avoid federal preemption problems and conflicts with other areas of IP law. See
Popper, supra note 18, at 57–58. Thus, it disallows any claim if the end product is copyrightable or is merchandise manufactured pursuant to a copyright or trademark license. See
§ 19.330.030. It also disallows claims in which the allegation of stolen information technology is based upon a claim of patent infringement or trade secret misappropriation under
U.S. law. Id. Furthermore, no claim may be brought under the statute if the allegation that
the information technology is stolen is based on a claim that its use violates the terms of an
open source software license. Id.
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accomplish its goal: put manufacturers on notice that they face liability in
the United States for selling products produced with pirated software.
In April 2013, the Washington State attorney general invoked the
Washington IT theft statute to penalize the large Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer for using unlicensed Microsoft software in its product
development and selling those products in Washington.210
b. Louisiana’s Statute
Louisiana’s specialized unfair competition statute, passed in 2010, is far
terser and in some ways far broader than Washington’s statute.211 It provides merely that,
It shall be unlawful for a person to develop or manufacture a product, or to develop or supply a service using stolen or misappropriated
property, including but not limited to computer software that does
not have the necessary copyright licenses, where that product or service is sold or offered for sale in competition with those doing business in this state.212
Under the Louisiana statute, a manufacturer of any type of product
(without the broad exemptions of the Washington statute) is potentially
liable if the product was made using unlicensed software and subsequently sold in the state.213 Arguably, direct liability could extend to any
producer that manufactures a product, or perhaps even outsources the
manufacture of a product, using unlicensed software if that product is
subsequently sold in Louisiana.214 The Louisiana statute, therefore, potentially provides an even larger swath of producers with an incentive to
favor “legitimate” supply chains and pressure contract partners and subsidiaries overseas to purge their systems of unlicensed software. On the
other hand, the Louisiana statute does not include the express third-party
liability provisions of the Washington statute.
2. Existing State Unfair Competition Laws
Proponents of the unfair competition approach argue that in states
with no specialized unfair competition statutes specifically targeting IT
theft, existing broad state unfair competition laws may be employed to
the same effect.215 In their 2011 letter to the FTC, for example, the attorneys general suggest that state unfair competition statutes modeled after
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (so-called “mini-FTC
Acts”) could be used to sanction this form of alleged unfair competition
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
183, at

See Wash. Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 19.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1427 (2014).
Id. (1).
See id.
Compare id., with § 19.330.080(1)(b).
See Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., supra note 70, at 2; Kappos & Baden, supra note
2–3.
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at the state level.216 A number of states, including Massachusetts, California, Florida, Vermont, and Montana, have facially broad statutes prohibiting unfair business conduct.217 For example, Section 17200 of the
California Business and Professions Code authorizes the state attorney
general to seek an injunction and civil penalties for acts of unfair competition, broadly defined to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”218 Similarly, Massachusetts’s unfair competition
law broadly prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” giving
the attorney general broad discretion to define unfair competition.219
At the time of this writing, three states—Massachusetts, California, and
Tennessee—have invoked general unfair competition statutes to penalize
foreign manufacturers for selling in those states goods produced using
unlicensed software.220 In 2012, the Massachusetts attorney general
brought an action under the Massachusetts unfair competition law,
quoted above, against a Thai seafood distributor. 221 The attorney general
argued that by “avoiding the cost of obtaining legitimate licenses to
software used in its business activities,” the Thai company “was able to
reduce its costs and gain an unfair advantage over local companies that
paid for the right to use such software products.”222 The distributor
agreed to pay a $10,000 civil penalty and cease using pirated software.223
In 2013, the California attorney general invoked California’s unfair competition statute to bring actions against two apparel manufacturers, from
India and China, both of which allegedly used unlicensed software in
their business operations.224 Also in 2013, Tennessee’s attorney general
announced a settlement with a Thai tire manufacturer that allegedly used
pirated software in its business operations while competing with Tennessee tire manufacturers.225
3. Unfair Competition Under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act)
Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the Commission extremely broad powers to prohibit ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com216. See Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., supra note 70, at 2 (“Many of our states have laws
that can be used to address this harm, including statutes patterned after the Federal Trade
Commission Act, other consumer protection laws and, in the case of Washington and Louisiana, statutes specifically designed to address this problem.”).
217. See Popper, supra note 18, at 36–39; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.202(2) (West 2014);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(A) (West 2014).
218. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17202, 17204, 17206(a) (West 2014).
219. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § 2(a) (West 2014).
220. See Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., supra note 19; ABA Panelists Report, supra
note 19.
221. See Office of the Att’y Gen. of Mass., supra note 19.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Cal. Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 19. The cases remain pending at the
time of this writing.
225. See ABA Panelists Report, supra note 19.
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merce.’’226 Congress intentionally drafted Section 5 broadly to address
new unfair trade practices that do not fall within conduct proscribed by
the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.227 Despite its potential to be a significant force in shaping competition policy in the United States in antitrust matters and beyond, it remains a little-used provision that has
played an insignificant role in competition policy.228 Nevertheless, commentators including former FTC commissioner William Kovacic argue
that the FTC should more vigorously employ Section 5 to address anticompetitive business practices.229 Professor Popper agrees with the attorneys general230 that it is a proper exercise of FTC power under Section 5
to sanction manufacturers who avail themselves of unlicensed software
and sell the resultant products in the United States.231
In short, software copyright owners are pressing state attorneys general, legislators, and federal regulators to recognize the illicit use of
software in a product’s supply chain as actionable unfair competition.
Copyright owners have begun to explore and articulate a new and evolving market-pressure strategy to remedy foreign software piracy, and are
enlisting the help of an increasingly sympathetic U.S. manufacturing sector to do so.
C. SUMMARIZING

THE

CASE STUDIES

The key commonality between the case studies in this Part is that they
seek to tie market access in some form to copyright law compliance,
rather than attempting to stamp out piracy or coerce copyright compliance through direct copyright enforcement strategies. In the case of the
Chinese online video portals, copyright compliance is a prerequisite for
accessing the market for major transnational advertisers. In the case of
foreign manufacturers using pirated software in their business operations,
copyright compliance is a prerequisite for accessing U.S. markets.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PRIVATE ORDERING,
OPTIMAL TARGETING, AND SOCIAL NORMS
This Part proposes a framework for analyzing and evaluating the market-pressure strategies employed in the case studies in Part II. This
framework draws on theory from three areas of legal scholarship: private
ordering, optimal targeting, and social norms. This Part argues that while
many of the market-pressure strategies described in this Article involve
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), (a)(4)(B) (2014).
227. See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930 (2010).
228. Id. at 932–33.
229. See generally id.; ALBERT A. FOER, AM. ANTITRUST INST., SECTION 5 AS A
BRIDGE TOWARD CONVERGENCE, 2, 3, 9–10 (Oct. 17, 2008), available at https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc-act-competition-statute/
afoer.pdf.
230. See Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., supra note 70.
231. Popper, supra note 18, at 36, 51–52.
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some private ordering or are analogous to certain private ordering strategies, they are unlikely to raise many of the concerns that scholars have
highlighted with respect to private ordering in the copyright context. It
further argues that a successful market-pressure strategy begins with
identifying and pressuring an intermediary (or group of intermediaries)
with sufficient leverage over the infringer to foreclose market access (retail markets, advertising markets, and so on). In many cases, however,
intermediaries will be in a strong position to apply initial pressure, either
through contract or as a result of a business relationship with the infringer, but will be in a poor position to police infringing behavior on an
ongoing basis. Therefore, a market-pressure strategy is most likely to be
successful if it stimulates the reshaping of the infringer group’s copyright
compliance social norms.
A. PRIVATE ORDERING
Some market-pressure strategies analyzed in this Article involve private leveraging of market forces to compel compliance with copyright
law. In this sense, they involve aspects of “private ordering”—i.e., voluntary arrangements by private parties through contract or customary
norms.232 To the extent, however, that there even is such a thing as
“pure” private ordering in lieu or in absence of “public” regulation,233
that does not describe the market-pressure strategies analyzed herein.
These strategies are unambiguously hybrid in nature: they may leverage
private relationships, but do so to achieve compliance with the law. Nevertheless, even if they are not “pure” private ordering strategies, marketpressure strategies potentially arouse some of the concerns scholars express about private ordering. It is therefore worthwhile to summarize
those concerns and consider whether they apply in this context.
A rich literature explores private ordering in the copyright space, focusing on private parties’ use of technology, contracts, and collective
rights management to develop extralegal norms and standards.234 As
Yafit Lev-Aretz points out, most of that scholarship considers copyright
232. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of
Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295,
1297 (1998).
233. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 232, at 1297–98 (arguing that the notion of purely
“private” ordering is illusory because law provides a background structure—for example,
property and contract rules—that defines the boundaries and enables the enforcement of
private arrangements).
234. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 232, at 1167–72; Radin & Wagner, supra note
232, at 1310–11; Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 166–69; Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View
of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND L. REV. 2063, 2065–66 (2000);
Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 470–74 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace];
Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice, supra note 14, at 210–11, 249; Robert
P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian World” of
On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 118–19, 127–28 (1997); Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1090–91
(1998); Bridy, supra note 15, at 83–84.
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private ordering in two contexts: user–industry relationships (e.g. copyright owners’ attempts to employ technology and contracts to achieve
levels of content protection equal to or exceeding that afforded by copyright law), and inter-industry relationships (e.g. employing collective
rights organizations to reduce transaction costs).235 Scholars have paid
less attention to the type of private ordering most germane to this Article236: cross-industry partnerships, which involve private agreements or
understandings between copyright owners and technology providers or
other industry players, particularly to address enforcement issues.237 One
example is the “three strikes” policies that some Internet service providers have voluntarily adopted, by which the service provider sends warnings to, and potentially even disrupts the service of, users engaged in
infringing activities such as unauthorized file sharing.238 Another example is the voluntary online advertising “best practices”—which several
online ad networks have adopted—concerning ad placement on websites
known to facilitate a large volume of infringing activity.239
The debate surrounding copyright and private ordering has revolved
around two main arguments: those optimistic about private ordering tout
the lowered transaction and enforcement costs and concomitant efficiency gains that result from private rule making, agreements, and construction of shared norms.240 Those skeptical about private ordering, on
the other hand, worry that such arrangements result from closed, opaque
processes involving private parties without public input.241 They also
worry that self-help through means such as electronic contracting and
digital rights management technologies affords copyright owners even
greater control over their works than the law does, resulting in diminished access to knowledge.242
235. Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice, supra note 14, at 249–50.
236. The unfair competition approach discussed in Part II.B, above, is not a private
ordering strategy. It is, however, an indirect enforcement strategy that parallels certain
private ordering strategies. In particular, the Washington State IT Theft statute is overtly
designed to incentivize U.S. retailers and manufacturers to develop and enforce private
measures—industry norms and contractual provisions—aimed at reducing the use of pirated software by overseas suppliers. See supra Part II.B.1.
237. Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice, supra note 14, at 250.
238. Bridy, supra note 15, at 84–85; Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1373, 1374 (2010).
239. See infra Part IV.C.2.
240. See generally Merges, supra note 234, at 116–17, 135; Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1294–95, 1307 (1996); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval
Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 18–20 (Working Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543.
241. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 15, at 126 (recommending that “privately implemented
graduated response regimes,” by which Internet users’ access might be disrupted in response to large volumes of infringing activity, should build in substantial consumer protections); Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 177 (“The central political question[ ] that is essential
to the legitimacy of publicly-structured private ordering is that the forms of structuring are
sufficient to ensure that the outcomes produce—when implemented through private ordering—a balance of rights and access that furthers the optimal supply of knowledge.”).
242. See, e.g., Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 234, at 559.
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Concerns about the expansion of copyright control through private
means such as technology and contract are less germane to the marketpressure enforcement strategies discussed herein. In general, the strategies focused on in this Article aim to improve compliance with existing
copyright law and norms, not to achieve greater control through private
mechanisms.
More relevant are the process-related concerns that cross-industry
deals will be struck, and norms will develop, with consideration of the
interests of only those copyright owners and technology companies at the
bargaining table.243 In theory, negative externalities could result from private enforcement arrangements. One can imagine, for example, copyright
owners in the China online video context244 pressuring advertisers to ensure video websites expunge all unlicensed uses of content. Such measures would be over-inclusive, as the expunged content would include
parodies, incidental or de minimis uses, and other uses that might be considered “fair” under Chinese copyright law.245 Likewise, in the context of
pressuring ad networks not to place ads on “infringing” websites, as discussed in Part IV.C.2, below, the public interest would be harmed by
norms or practices that result in the shuttering of websites that facilitate
access to a small amount of infringing content and a substantial amount
of non-infringing content.246
In practice, such ratcheting up of standards has not materialized with
respect to the market-pressure strategies discussed herein. Under the
market-pressure model, the key demandeurs are intermediaries (e.g.,
brand owners) who care only that their infringing business associates
(e.g., websites) comply (or appear to comply) with basic copyright norms.
The intermediaries have little reason to advance a maximalist copyright
agenda. Indeed, a maximalist approach might undermine their interests.247 Copyright owners employ the market-pressure enforcement
243. See Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice, supra note 14, at 254;
Bridy, supra note 15, at 124–31.
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. For a discussion of fair use under Chinese law, see Zhiwen Liang, Beyond the Copyright Act: The Fair Use Doctrine Under Chinese Judicial Opinions 56 J. COPY. SOC’Y
U.S.A. 695 (2009).
246. See infra Part IV.C.2.
247. For example, in the unfair competition context discussed in Part II.B, supra, U.S.based customers have little reason to favor a maximalist approach that might increase the
cost of software licenses and accordingly increase the cost of manufacturing. Likewise, in
the context of online video websites in Part II.A, supra, advertisers arguably benefit most
when the sites host the best content. In theory, the more robust the copyright environment,
the more challenging and expensive it is for websites to acquire the newest, most desirable
content. A maximalist copyright approach would therefore result in websites offering less
attractive content, leading to diminished viewership. To support content costs, advertisers
would be paying more for the opportunity to reach that diminished viewership. True, some
advertisers contend that more traffic does not necessarily equal more value since major
brands consider much of the traffic on infringing websites be of low value. See Advertisers
Gradually Turn Down Video Sharing Site Hosting Unlicensed Content, supra note 112. As
this Author has pointed out in the China context, however, it is probably wrong to assume
that piracy does not attract affluent consumers. See Priest, supra note 3, at 480 (citing 2008
China National Reading Survey Report indicating that more than half of those surveyed
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model because they have difficulty achieving basic copyright compliance
under highly challenging enforcement conditions, not out of a desire to
ratchet up copyright standards.248
The questions of process and the public interest also have an international dimension with respect to these market-pressure strategies. Two
points in this regard are worth raising. First, while most of the private
strategies discussed herein are transnational, they generally do not involve extrusion of U.S. law. The goal of these strategies is to coerce infringers to comply with their existing home laws, not with U.S. law or a
set of supranational copyright norms or rules.249 In that sense, these strategies are quite compatible with the territoriality principle.250 Second,
when normatively evaluating such transnational market ordering strategies, it is important to consider the effect on stakeholders, including the
public, in the infringer’s jurisdiction. After all, the applicable copyright
law and corresponding public interest typically will be those of the jurisdiction in which the infringement occurred. In this regard, the case of the
Chinese video sites251 provides a useful data point on the strategy’s effect
on the major stakeholders: copyright owners, advertisers, video websites
(the erstwhile infringers), and the public. In that example, copyright owners enjoyed an unprecedented rise in online licensing fees, and creators
both large and small were compensated for their productions.252 Most
importantly, the copyright owners who arguably benefitted the most were
local Chinese producers.253 The websites burnished their brands, particularly in the eyes of major advertisers, leading to more lucrative crossbranding opportunities.254 The websites were also able to better distinguish their services from competitors’ through the use of exclusive licensholding college and graduate degrees purchased pirated content, and that nearly 60 percent of individuals categorized as enterprise leaders, management, and professionals
bought pirated goods).
248. Cf. Sean A. Pager, Accentuating the Positive: Building Capacity for Creative Industries into the Development Agenda for Global Intellectual Property Law, 28 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 223, 265 (2012) (noting that combating the pervasive commercial piracy problem in
Nigeria’s film industry “need not entail advancing any ‘maximalist’ agenda beyond adhering to traditional copyright norms, nor does it pose undue risks to freedom of expression”).
249. The analysis here might be different if major intermediaries place requirements,
contractual or otherwise, on partners that entail something beyond mere compliance with
local copyright law. In the environmental protection context, for example, some U.S.-based
contract buyers impose contractual environmental standards that exceed those required by
local law. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 931 n.77, 950 (2007).
250. See supra Part I.A.
251. Supra Part II.A.
252. See supra Part II.A.
253. See Loretta Chao, China’s Youku Goes Hollywood, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703675904576063510245910424 (“Chinese
companies say most U.S. content gets less traffic from Chinese viewers than popular Chinese TV series do.”).
254. See Melita Kuburas, Youku Tudou Turns Quarterly Profit of $7.3M, Talks Content
Strategy, STREAM DAILY (Feb. 28, 2014), http://streamdaily.tv/2014/02/28/youku-tudouturns-profit-of-7-4m-discusses-2014-strategy/ (noting that Youku Tudou Inc. works with
nearly five hundred advertisers and produces sponsored content for major international
brands including Mercedes Benz and Mini Cooper).
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ing fees.255 Advertisers could work confidently with video websites and
not worry about tarnishing their reputations.256 Finally, the public continued to have access to large amounts of high-quality, free, ad-supported
content, which, as long as it was licensed, was no longer subject to
takedowns.
There is little to suggest that the copyright owners in the two case studies above sought to do more than substitute an effective enforcement
mechanism for failed copyright enforcement systems.257 In other words,
the main objective seems to be to motivate companies that benefit substantially from infringement to comply with the copyright law of their
jurisdictions.258 Accordingly, the remainder of this Article will analyze
these strategies under the assumption that that is the aim, and that this
aim is fully compatible with the public interest balances embodied in the
copyright laws (recognizing, as well, the attendant public choice concerns259 that are beyond the scope of this Article).
B. THE ROLE OF “POWERBROKER”
MARKET-PRESSURE MODEL

IN THE

Legitimate concerns about process and private ordering notwithstanding, market-pressure strategies are promising surrogates for traditional
copyright enforcement because at their best such strategies effectively
leverage powerful entities that can influence infringers. In this way, market-pressure strategies parallel traditional copyright enforcement, in
which the state’s enforcement elements (e.g., courts and administrative
agencies) act as “powerbrokers,” wielding influence over the infringer
that the copyright owner, absent the state’s backing, does not usually
have. (See Figure 1, below.) In jurisdictions where the state’s influence
over infringers is weak, the state may be replaced in the enforcement
chain by a powerful “third party” with greater influence over the infringer. In some cases, that third party possessing power to influence the
infringer might be a key client or business partner (or group thereof), as
was the case with the Chinese video websites and their advertisers discussed in Part II.A. (See Figure 2, below.)
As we saw in the infringement-as-unfair-competition case study,260 the
“third party” surrogate might even be the government of a state other
255. See Wang Fei’er, supra note 98.
256. See, e.g., Marketing in China: Youku Tudou’s Ad Campaign Delivered Millions of
Views, 2 Billion Impressions, EMARKETER (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.emarketer.com/
Article/Marketing-China-Youku-Tudous-Ad-Campaign-Delivered-Millions-of-Views-2-Bil
lion-Impressions/1011227 (interviewing Youku Tudou Inc. executive who describes a recent
successful Intel viral marketing campaign on Youku).
257. See supra Parts II.A, B.
258. See supra Parts II.A, B.
259. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (describing the highly
politicized process of copyright lawmaking in the United States).
260. See supra Part II.B.
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than that in which the infringement occurred.261 In the case of overseas
manufacturers using pirated software, the copyright remedies in their
home country have little deterrent effect on infringing behavior. Copyright owners therefore seek to leverage the U.S. government’s power to
restrict access to its markets. In such a case, the government of the second
state may be motivated to act in this role if it perceives a sufficient harm
to its domestic interests (e.g., harm to U.S.-based competitors), and a law
exists that empowers or compels the state to act or back a private right of
action. (See Figure 3, below.) To motivate a private third party to effectively back the rights of another, a motivating factor must be located.
Motivation can take myriad forms: it could be a sense of intrinsic or public shame derived from social norms about standards of proper conduct, it
could be threatened economic consequences (such as customers’ threats
of a boycott), or it could be legal action threatened or initiated against
the third party.
THE ROLE

OF

POWERBROKERS IN DIRECT AND INDIRECT COPYRIGHT
ENFORCEMENT CHAINS262

State

Pol
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Copyright
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Figure 1 — Diagram depicting traditional copyright enforcement power relationships.

261. As noted above, this might raise trade discrimination issues under international
law for the second state. See Pager & Priest, supra note 182. Although that analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article, discriminatory laws or application of laws may be permitted in limited circumstances where a compelling state interest is found. See id.
262. Circles indicate parties, arrows indicate levers of influence, and dotted lines
indicate where a “powerbroker” intermediary is substituted for the state with jurisdiction
over the infringer for copyright infringement.
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Figure 2 — Market-pressure enforcement model, substituting the state with a private entity or
group thereof (such as advertisers) possessing economic leverage over the infringer.
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Figure 3 — Market-pressure enforcement model, replacing a state that has jurisdiction over
the infringer in a copyright action (likely the infringer’s domicile or the country where the
infringement occurred) with a second state that has the power to limit the infringer’s access to
the second state’s markets. (The infringement-as-unfair-competition approach discussed in
Part II.B, supra, exemplifies this model.).
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Figure 4 — Traditional copyright enforcement power relationships in the contributory infringement context.
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Figure 5 — Market-pressure enforcement model, replacing a state that has jurisdiction over
the infringer in a copyright action (likely the infringer’s domicile or the country where the
infringement occurred) with a second state that has police power leverage over purchasers in
the second state, who in turn have economic or contractual leverage over the infringer. (The
secondary liability provisions of the Washington State “Anti-IT Theft” unfair competition
statute described in Part II.B.1.a, supra, exemplify this model.)

C. OPTIMAL TARGETING AND THE IMPORTANCE
INFRINGER NORMS

OF

RESHAPING

Examples abound in which the law imposes legal liability on thirdparty “gatekeepers” who are well positioned to disrupt the illegal activity
of others.263 Contributory copyright liability discussed in Part I, above, is
a well-known example from the copyright field, but many areas of law,
including tort law and securities law, extend liability from a primary
wrongdoer to a “gatekeeper” or “enabler.”264 Daryl Levinson uses the
term “optimal targeting” to denote strategies that engage the parties who
are best situated to police wrongdoing.265 As he argues, often “[t]he optimal target of liability is not the wrongdoing injurer but rather some other
individual, institution, or group that is well situated to monitor and control the wrongdoer’s behavior and can be motivated to do so by the threat
of ‘indirect liability.’”266 Levinson’s notion of optimal targeting extends
beyond gatekeepers motivated by legal liability, however.267 It encompasses the broader notion that any time a third party’s influence can be
brought to bear against a wrongdoer, it can be an effective and efficient
solution so long as two conditions are met: (1) the target of the indirect
liability is able to control the wrongdoing in a cost-effective way, and (2)
263. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53–54, 62–64 (1986); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888–92 (1984);
Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 361–62, 365–67 (2003) [hereinafter Levinson, Collective Sanctions].
264. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, supra note 263, at 365–67.
265. Levinson, supra note 93, at 1154.
266. Id. at 1148.
267. See id. at 1154–60.
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the subsidiary costs of indirect liability are not too high.268
The two case studies in Part II are examples of attempts at “optimal
targeting,” used to spur behavioral changes in jurisdictions in which direct
legal action produces suboptimal results. In the first, the key advertisers
are primary economic underwriters of the Chinese video websites, and
are themselves part of a community of major transnational companies
that identify with group norms of IP compliance.269 In the second case
study, major software producers have targeted state governments around
the United States and motivated them, through various political and public interest levers, to use their substantial power and influence to induce
overseas manufacturers to cease pirated software use.270 In addition, the
Washington State unfair competition statute expressly made certain instate parties secondarily liable, providing a potentially powerful incentive
for in-state businesses to police the infringements of their contract
suppliers.271
Scholars in fields such as environmental law and labor law have recommended using analogous market-pressure strategies to induce major multinational companies to police suppliers in markets where regulatory
failure exists.272 Like copyright law, environmental regulations in many
emerging markets suffer from inadequate enforcement, and territoriality
and sovereignty issues limit their enforcement in other jurisdictions.273 In
response to this regulatory failure, consumers and non-governmental organizations have pressured a number of influential “powerbroker” multinational companies to contractually impose environmental standards on
their overseas subsidiaries and suppliers.274 Multinationals who contractually impose environmental obligations include major retailers WalMart, Costco, and Target, and many leading manufacturers in the automotive, personal computer, lumber, and industrial machinery and equipment industries.275 When these contractual provisions are enforced,
evidence suggests that they have a positive effect on the environment in
exporting countries or, at a minimum, on the rate at which firms in those
countries comply with their home country’s environmental laws or with
private environmental standards.276 Similarly, in the context of labor
standards, Annette Burkeen argues that private-ordering strategies
aimed at pressuring transnational companies to enforce international labor norms through supply-chain contracting and corporate codes of con268. Id. at 1150–51 (citing Judge Posner’s rule in In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation,
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)).
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
272. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 249; Annette Burkeen, Private Ordering
and Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting
Global Labor Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 205 (2007).
273. Vandenbergh, supra note 249, at 920–21.
274. Id. at 919–21.
275. Id. at 950–55.
276. Id. at 955–56, 970.
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duct are more likely to improve global labor conditions than international
or national laws alone.277 As is true in the environmental context, ongoing enforcement of privately imposed standards is crucial to success.278
Aspirational corporate codes of conduct that are not binding on suppliers
or buyers have been mostly ineffectual.279 Indeed, the most effective arrangements appear to be those in which major buyers are pressured to
accept joint legal liability for substandard wages or working conditions in
their suppliers’ facilities.280
Identifying a suitably influential intermediary is only one element of an
effective market-pressure strategy. In many cases, the ideal target for inducing a behavioral change will be in a suboptimal position to police the
infringing behavior on an ongoing basis. This is true with respect to both
of the case studies in Parts II.A and II.B, above. In the first, the advertisers have neither the resources nor the information necessary to determine whether each website properly licensed the potentially thousands of
videos with which their ads may appear. In the second case study, U.S.based competing manufacturers and state attorneys general are in a
suboptimal position to identify and sanction on an ongoing basis the use
of unlicensed software. Contractual obligations, such as in the above example concerning environmental supply-chain contracting, are enforceable on an ongoing basis.281 But in the absence of a norm shift, the success
of supply-chain contracting initiatives depends on the contracting customer’s proactive enforcement of the supplier’s obligations.282
A second element, therefore, of a successful market-pressure strategy
is optimization of the conditions for reshaping the copyright compliance
and infringement norms of the infringer group. An examination of market-pressure strategies requires, therefore, a review of the relevant aspects of social norms theory to help identify under what conditions a shift
in norms from infringing to non-infringing behavior is most likely to be
achieved.
D. ANTI-COPYING SOCIAL NORMS
A strategy of compelling copyright compliance through market pressures is most likely to succeed long term if it effectuates a permanent shift
in the norms—that is, widely adhered-to patterns of behavior283—surrounding copyright infringement in the target community. Strategies that
277. Burkeen, supra note 272, at 212–13, 247–54.
278. Id. at 247–54.
279. See Mark Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing
the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 5 (2013) (“There is a growing consensus, at least among social scientists, that codes of conduct and auditing programs have failed to eliminate, or perhaps even
substantially reduce, incidents of labor violations in global supply chains.”).
280. See id. at 14–42.
281. See Vandenbergh, supra note 249, at 942–44.
282. See id. at 918.
283. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 537 (2003).
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focus on deterrence and not on causing norm shifts might achieve shortterm gains, such as prompting the one-off purchase of content licenses by
individual Chinese online video websites, or one-off software license
purchases in the case of individual manufacturers sued under a state’s
unfair competition law. However, it is difficult to sustain such pressures
long term against one or a handful of infringers, let alone against entire
industries.
A major function of law is to guide and shape social norms.284 Social
psychology research shows that the law works best when the incentives or
motivations for compliance transcend pure coercion and punishment
avoidance and the law’s target group members internalize its objectives
because they perceive it to be just or to confer private benefits.285 Where
IP laws have been less effective, they have failed to induce broad, sustained anti-infringement norms.286 As Paul Goldstein put it, a copyright
law that relies solely on legal deterrence to achieve its ends by punishing
every transgression “would be as futile as it is costly.”287 Rather, “copyright’s most effective role [is] as a norm for self-enforcement.”288 It is
important for architects of market ordering strategies designed to achieve
copyright law compliance to recognize that where compliance is low, procopyright norms are weak. The most successful market-pressure strategies, therefore, will not only deter infringement but also induce the creation of anti-infringement norms.
1. Close-Knit Groups
In recent years, a strand of scholarship on IP and social norms has provided insights into the conditions that lead to successful development of
anti-copying social norms. Two conditions highlighted in the literature are
of particular relevance here. First, anti-copying norms are most effective
in smaller, tightly integrated social groups.289 This is because integrated
284. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 61 (1997); Richard
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,
349 (1997); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 88 (1999); Raymond T. Nimmer, Information
Wars and the Challenges of Content Protection in Digital Contexts, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 825, 833 (2011).
285. Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1267–1268
(2011) [hereinafter Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash]; cf. Tom R. Tyler & Steven L.
Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative
Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349 (2003); Erik J. Girvan, Rethinking
the Economic Model of Deterrence: How Insights from Empirical Social Science Could Affect Policies Towards Crime and Punishment, 5 REV. LAW & ECON. 461, 467–72 (2009)
(canvassing social psychological research that demonstrates the important role of social
norms and reputation effects in deterring criminal behavior).
286. See Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at 595.
287. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 214 (2003).
288. Id.; see also Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands
Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
651, 661–65 (2006) (arguing that increasing copyright enforcement activity or penalties is
less likely to be as efficient or effective as a normative strategy).
289. See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY 81,
176–77 (2012).
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group dynamics foster interpersonal relationships through which information is exchanged and social rewards and sanctions, which are central to
the efficacy of social norms, can be applied.290 Rewards can take the form
of increased levels of esteem in the eyes of peers for enforcing or observing accepted norms,291 or enhanced future opportunities for exchange
with group members by signaling willingness to enforce or observe accepted norms.292 Likewise, sanctions for a failure to enforce or observe
accepted norms involve the loss of esteem or future opportunities for exchange among group members. Consequently, the larger and more looseknit the relevant group, the less effective or present norms tend to be.293
Second, anti-copying norms are most common between rival producers
who identify with and seek the approval of a particular professional community.294 A substantial body of recent scholarship examines “negative
IP spaces”—fields of commercial or social interaction that are mostly unregulated by IP laws—in which community norms have developed
around copying. Scholars writing in this vein explore the intellectualproperty-like, community-enforced norms that govern acts of copying in
such diverse fields as comedy,295 roller derby,296 tattoos,297 magic,298 and
French cuisine.299 These insights generally derive from examinations of
norms concerning copying among competing producers of ideas or information. Anti-copying norms generally are less relevant to wide-scale infringements by consumers or users of information goods, as opposed to
producers.300 One reason why anti-copying norms are more likely to arise
among producers rather than consumers is that producers who copy the
works of others as producers are more likely make their copies public,
while much consumer copying is private (or pseudo-private, in the case of
Internet file sharing). The public nature of copying by producers not only
makes the copying potentially more egregious, offensive, and damaging
to the originator and thus more “action-worthy,” but also makes it far
easier for the originator to discover and act upon the copying.
290. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 181 (1991).
291. See McAdams, supra note 284, at 355–72.
292. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–27 (2000).
293. Id.; Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at 557–62.
294. RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 289, at 177.
295. See id. at 97–122.
296. See David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2012).
297. See Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 512–14
(2012).
298. See Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property
Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC 123–42 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010).
299. See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008).
300. RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 289, at 177. Raustiala and Sprigman do highlight some situations in which consumers have internalized anti-copying norms and been
active in policing transgressions of those norms, such as comedy fans who post videos online demonstrating close similarities between comedy routines in order to publicly shame
comedians who allegedly use others’ jokes without permission. Id. at 115.
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2. Loose-Knit Groups
Can norms develop to change behavior even in settings that do not
involve close-knit groups, and in which the behavioral change would lead
to a net loss for each individual actor? Norm theorists in the legal literature have addressed this question in the contexts of environmental protection301 and peer-to-peer file sharing.302 Both contexts involve large
numbers of generally unassociated individuals for whom compliance with
socially beneficial or legally prescribed norms (environmental responsibility and pro-copyright behavior) would result in personal detriment.
In the environmental law context, activists face a collective action
problem. Individuals are not incentivized to reduce their toxic emissions
because no individual’s behavioral change would meaningfully reduce
emissions overall, while the immediate individual payoff for doing so is
negative in terms of the financial cost or effort required.303 Michael
Vandenbergh argues that the best way to induce socially beneficial behavior that contradicts the individual’s immediate self-interest is to activate
“personal norms”—that is, “obligations that are enforced through an internalized sense of duty to act and guilt or related emotions for failure to
act”—rather than social norms enforced through group sanctions and rewards.304 Citing social psychology literature on norm activation,
Vandenbergh argues that a concrete personal norm against socially undesirable behavior, such as toxic emission, will arise when “new information
induces the individual to believe that . . . individuals’ behavior in the aggregate causes an environmental problem and that reductions in the behavior (e.g., backyard burning or driving) . . . by individuals in the
aggregate will ameliorate the problem.”305
A robust body of scholarship examines the social norms that have
taken root in loose-knit peer-to-peer file-sharing networks on the Internet.306 File sharers violate copyright law—often knowingly307—by
downloading copyrighted works from others, and by placing copyrighted
digital files on their hard drives for others to download.308 File-sharing
301. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Norms: How Personal Norm Activation
Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. L. REV. 1101 (2005).
302. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 283; Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash,
supra note 285; Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577 (2005); Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127 (2005) [hereinafter Depoorter & Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement].
303. Vandenbergh, supra note 301, at 1108.
304. Id. at 1104.
305. Id. at 1123–24.
306. See Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at 509–10; Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash,
supra note 285, at 1253–55; Feldman & Nadler, supra note 302, at 578; Depoorter & Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement, supra note 302, at 1127.
307. According to one study, the propensity to engage in file-sharing activities among
frequent file sharers actually increased with an increase in the severity of copyright law
sanctions. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 285, at 1281–83.
308. There is disagreement about whether merely making a copy of a work publicly
available for unauthorized download, irrespective of any actual dissemination of that work,
violates the copyright owner’s distribution right under U.S. law. Compare Capitol Records,
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networks are loose-knit communities, largely comprised of strangers,
which can number in the tens of millions.309 The prevailing norm on peerto-peer networks is copyright law non-compliance.310 Shifting to copyright compliance would result in the negative payoff that users would
cease to access free content.311 There is little mystery surrounding why
individuals engage in downloading activity on file-sharing networks: the
price for noncompliance (the probability of being sued by copyright owners) is low, while the payoff—access to a vast array of free content—is
high.312 It is not obvious, however, why many engage in uploading—that
is, the act of making files available to strangers even though uploading is
generally not required in order to participate in file-sharing networks.
Uploading therefore confers on the uploader no immediate benefit and,
to the contrary, renders her vulnerable to severe legal consequences.
File sharers are willing to upload against the law and their own interests because certain norms—the reciprocity norm in particular—guide
file-sharing communities despite those communities’ vast and loose-knit
character.313 The reciprocity norm is the basic, powerful norm that motivates individuals to reciprocate the actions of others and cooperate in
response to cooperation by others.314 Lior Strahilevitz posits that individuals on file-sharing networks are motivated to alleviate feelings of guilt or
indebtedness engendered by others’ willingness to cooperate by sharing
Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (2008) (holding that an infringing distribution
requires “actual dissemination”), with Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that merely making an unauthorized copy
of a work available to the public violates the distribution right). However, the unauthorized copying of a file into one’s “shared” folder for dissemination on peer-to-peer networks could violate the reproduction right. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
309. See Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, File Sharing and Copyright, in 10
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 19, 24–25 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2010)
(noting that at various points in time file-sharing networks the Pirate Bay and Napster had
25 million and 30 million users, respectively).
310. See Feldman & Nadler, supra note 302, at 584–91.
311. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 285, at 1288 (noting that
peer-to-peer users who internalized the anti-copyright norms before questions of file sharing’s legality were settled “might experience loss aversion when the previously ‘free’ access
to content made available by the new technology is suddenly illegal”). This may be changing in the music space, as new free, legal digital delivery services become mainstream, such
as Spotify, Pandora, and iTunes Radio, all of which deliver large catalogs of free, licensed
music. Nevertheless, the free versions of these services are ad-supported and suffer from
significant encumbrances or limitations (for example, the presence of ads, restrictions on
interactivity, low bit rates, and the inability to download and keep files) that may make
such services second-best options for many file sharers.
312. See Feldman & Nadler, supra note 302, at 609–11; Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at
580–82 (arguing that younger file sharers “have been socialized to believe that the copyright laws and the courts are largely ineffectual”).
313. See Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at 561–62. There is evidence that many file sharers
are also motivated to share because of anti-copyright norms. Depoorter et al., Copyright
Backlash, supra note 285, at 1284–85. For many in the file sharing community, the moral
justifications for file sharing derive from deeply held anti-copyright beliefs (even if these
beliefs reflect a self-serving bias), Id., which increase in intensity as copyright enforcement
activity increases. Id. This norm inversion (file sharing is right because copyright is wrong)
emboldens file sharers to make files available to strangers despite no immediate benefits
from doing so and despite being potentially subject to severe legal sanctions. Id.
314. Schultz, supra note 288, at 699; Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at 561–62.
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files.315 This, in turn, may lead to “reciprocity cascades,” in which individuals’ propensity to illegally share copyrighted files is not only reinforced
but also amplified through feedback effects within the group.316 Mark
Schultz observes a similar phenomenon among the fans of “jambands,”
but in those communities the reciprocity norm fosters anti-infringement
behavior.317 Jambands, such as the Grateful Dead, permit fans to record
the bands’ live performances and distribute them freely if the fans comply
with the band’s rules. Those rules typically require that the fan recordings
not be sold commercially and that any of the band’s professional studio
or live recordings not be shared freely.318 A desire to cooperate and reciprocate the generosity of the band and of other fans motivates individuals to comply with copyright law and behave within the scope of a
jamband’s permissions.319 The reciprocity norm also motivates fans to
sanction, through public shaming or exclusion from the community, other
fans who sell fan recordings or otherwise break the band’s rules.320 While
the reciprocity norm may be enforced through social sanctions, as it
sometimes is in the jamband fan communities,321 it is also a personal
norm of the type Vandenbergh highlighted because an internalized sense
of duty often motivates compliance with the rules.322
In short, anti-copying norms are most likely to arise or take root in
close-knit communities of rival content producers. Under certain conditions, however, norms can arise even in loose-knit communities of consumers—possibly even when norm compliance leads to net negative
payoffs for the individual. Theoretical and descriptive accounts in the legal scholarship of norm activation in loose-knit groups focuses on personal norms, that is, norms such as reciprocity that are enforced not
through community rewards and sanctions but through an internalized
sense of duty or a desire to alleviate feelings of guilt or indebtedness.
E. SUMMARY
Per the foregoing, the following conditions appear to be crucial to a
successful market-pressure strategy. First, the targeted powerbroker,
which can be an individual entity, a group of entities, or even a state,
must be able to motivate the infringer to cease the infringement in a costeffective way. The costs of inducing the powerbroker, furthermore, cannot be excessive.323 Second, because policing the infringement on an
ongoing basis is costly and powerbrokers may be poorly positioned to do
it, the strategy should maximize the conditions for effectuating anti-in315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Strahilevitz, supra note 283, at 563.
Id. at 567–68.
Schultz, supra note 288, at 681.
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 710–14.
Id. at 717.
See id.
See supra notes 303–305 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265–268 and accompanying text.

2015]

The Emerging Role of Market Ordering

223

fringement norms in the target infringer group. Anti-infringement norms
are most likely to take root in close-knit groups of rival content producers, but loose-knit groups of consumers may also develop personal norms
based on an internalized sense of duty and reciprocity. The following Part
evaluates the case studies in Part II through this lens, and then draws
some conclusions about maximizing the efficacy of market-pressure strategies aimed at infringements abroad.
IV. DISCUSSION
This Part analyzes and evaluates both of the case studies introduced in
Part II under the framework outlined in Part III. It then makes recommendations for optimizing market-pressure strategies that copyright owners are currently employing to address two vexing international
infringement problems: (1) the ongoing infringement-as-unfair-competition-strategy introduced in Part II, and (2) emerging efforts by content
owners to pressure advertisers and online ad networks to limit peer-topeer sites’ access to lucrative online advertising.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-INFRINGEMENT NORMS WITHIN
COMMUNITY OF MAJOR CHINESE INTERNET VIDEO SITES

THE

The Chinese Internet video sites’ remarkable transition from hosting
pirated content to hosting mostly licensed content appears to satisfy
many of the conditions for developing group anti-copying norms set forth
above. This likely explains why the market-pressure strategy in that case
was so successful. Namely, the advertisers were well positioned to pressure the video websites. Moreover, although the advertisers were not in a
position to cost-effectively control the websites, the symbiotic relationship between the advertisers and the websites put the advertisers in a
strong position to transmit to the websites general IP compliance norms,
so the community of websites could police itself. In addition, the major
Chinese video websites are a close-knit group, and indeed they can even
be characterized as rival producers, further increasing the likelihood that
anti-copying norms could take root.
1. Optimal Targeting and Norm Transmission
There may be some question as to whether targeting the Chinese video
websites’ advertising partners satisfies the first part of Levinson’s “optimal” targeting test.324 That is, the advertisers were in a strong position to
apply economic pressure on the video websites, but they were not necessarily well positioned to “control” the websites in a cost-effective way,
since they were poorly positioned to police the websites on an ongoing
basis. The advertisers have neither the resources nor the information necessary to determine whether each website properly licensed the potentially thousands of videos with which their ads appear at any given time.
324. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.

224

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Perhaps Levinson’s test is satisfied because the advertisers had the ability and willingness to remove ads (and precious advertising revenue) if
the websites did not comply with copyright, and that is all the “control”
that is required.325 This view, however, may gloss over an important reality of the advertisers’ and websites’ relationship. The advertisers have
considerable power to influence the video sites, to be sure, but their relationship with the sites may be best characterized as symbiotic: the websites need the advertising revenue, but the advertisers also need the
websites, since young audiences in China overwhelmingly turn to the Internet now for video content.326 If the advertisers were to withdraw completely and permanently from video websites, it is unclear to what
platform they would turn to access that critical demographic.327 As for
the video sites, their credibility with advertisers matters, and the websites
recognize that a healthy, constructive partnership with major advertisers
is critical to their long-term business development and
competitiveness.328
Therefore, the advertisers seem to have the requisite control to satisfy
Levinson’s test, but the “control” in this case derives not only from the
advertisers’ power to withdraw their ads but also from their symbiotic
relationship with the video sites, which enabled the advertisers to transmit their IP norms to the sites. The advertisers signaled to Chinese video
sites the IP norms of their community by making it clear that they were
not comfortable associating their brands with pirated content.329 This
may have occurred simultaneously with, and partly as a result of, one
325. See Levinson, supra note 93, at 1154–56.
326. See Sabrina, China TV and Online Videos Report 2013: Almost Half Don’t Watch
TV Anymore, CHINA INTERNET WATCH (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.chinainternet
watch.com/4254/china-tv-online-videos-report-2013/ (citing data by market research firm
ZDC indicating that nearly half of the survey respondents do not watch broadcast television anymore, and nearly 80 percent of viewers between the ages of eighteen and thirtyfive preferred watching online video over television); JENNY NG ET AL., VALUE PARTNERS,
TV 2.0: YOUNG CHINA TAKES TV VIEWING ONLINE 1, available at http://www.valuepart
ners.com/downloads/PDF_Comunicati/Perspective/value-partners-tv_2.0-young_chinatakes_tv-viewing_online-jenny-ng-tiger-shan-max-_parry-rogelio-bakels.pdf (reporting results of survey of urban Chinese secondary school and university students between ages
seventeen and twenty-two finding that “[t]he Chinese youths surveyed . . . spend most of
their time downloading and streaming online video as opposed to watching traditional
TV,” with nearly half of the youths surveyed claiming to watch no broadcast television at
all).
327. Youku CEO Victor Koo suggests that online video is critical for brand owners in
China: “This is the first generation of people [in China] buying cars and fridges. Video is
much more important [for brands in China than it is for brands in the United States, where
consumers have more brand awareness]. You cannot transmit the branding through text
banners and pictures.” Malcolm Moore, Youku Founder Victor Koo Believes Only China
Can Help His Company Grow, Make Money and Even Beat Piracy, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 14,
2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/8201764/Youku-founder-VictorKoo-believes-only-China-can-help-his-company-grow-make-money-and-even-beat-piracy.
html#_jmp0_.
328. See, e.g., Press Release, Youku Tudou Inc., Advertisers Turn to Youku Tudou
Dual-Platform Solutions (Dec. 13, 2012), http://ir.youku.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=241246
&p=irol-newsArticle_print&ID=1766959 (touting the company’s strong relationship with
major advertisers).
329. See supra Part II.A.
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member of the online video website group (Sohu.com) taking the lead on
anti-piracy issues in the community and joining lawsuits against the advertisers.330 These factors likely combined to trigger the websites’ investment in exclusive content licenses and their consequent internalization of
copyright compliance norms and community self-policing. It is worth noting that the small community of major Chinese video sites is able to selfpolice in part because the infringements are public, so other stakeholders
in the community can easily discover and act upon them.
The second element in Levinson’s test for efficient application of indirect liability—that the subsidiary costs of indirect liability not be excessive—clearly is met.331 As noted above, pressuring advertisers in this
case resulted in net benefits for all the stakeholders in China’s online
video ecosystem.332
2. The Reception of Anti-Infringement Norms by the Close-Knit
Community of China’s Video Websites
To stem online video piracy in China, copyright owners focused their
efforts on the video portals, in particular the handful of major players
with the majority of the market share.333 At the time that legal threats
against advertisers sparked the video content licensing frenzy among online video streaming services in 2009, seven sites occupied a combined
three-fourths of the online video market.334 The small size of the relevant
group of key players made it more likely that a forceful change in direction by one or a few members of the group would signal impending
change to the rest.
By allying in 2009 with two small video websites and more than fifty
video rights holders to sue infringing websites and (more importantly)
their advertisers,335 Sohu.com arguably acted as what Cass Sunstein calls
a “norm entrepreneur,” proactively leading a change in industry
norms.336 This might have been significant. In Robert Ellickson’s view,
norm entrepreneurs who propose new approaches for the group are the
“key participants in norm creation.”337 The changes that followed were
swift and striking as major online video sites scrambled to avoid losing
relationships with advertisers,338 calling to mind another Sunstein term:
330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 251–256 and accompanying text.
Yining Ding, Websites Vie for Profit from Free Online Video Streaming, SHANGHAI
DAILY, Mar. 10, 2010, at B4, available at http://www.shanghaidaily.com/Opinion/biz-com
mentary/Websites-vie-for-profit-from-free-online-video-streaming/shdaily.shtml (reporting
the fourth quarter 2009 market share of the top seven Chinese streaming video websites).
334. Id.
335. See supra Part II.A.
336. SUNSTEIN, supra note 284, at 36.
337. Robert C. Ellickson, How Norm Entrepreneurs and Membership Associations
Contribute to Private Ordering: A Response to Fagundes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 247, 249–50
(2012).
338. See supra Part II.A.
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“norm cascade,” that is, a rapid shift toward a new norm.339
As the major online video sites invested heavily in exclusive content
licenses, each became a stakeholder in the promotion of a legitimate online video ecosystem. Their interests concerning the protection of copyright became aligned not only with those of copyright owners but also
with those of the other members of the online video community that invested in exclusive content licenses. This common interest led the major
Chinese video portals to form alliances to pool content licenses and share
costs,340 and also to jointly sanction those members of the community
who failed to observe the new norms.341 For example, in November 2013,
Sohu, Youku-Tudou, and Tencent, China’s three largest online video platforms, teamed up with copyright owners to sue major Chinese search engine and online video platform Baidu, which had been slow to adopt the
new norms against hosting unlicensed content.342 At the time of the suit,
Youku-Tudou CEO Victor Koo expressly noted the shift in norms and the
desire to strengthen them further within the Chinese online video
industry:
Koo said mainstream video sites had managed to establish a healthy
eco-system through competition and collaboration, including a focus
on respecting intellectual property.
“We hope more people can join in, and together, with government,
authorities and copyright holders, [we hope] to strengthen cooperation, enhance technical measures, fight against hotlink[ing], combat
piracy and jointly promote the process of genuine network[ing],”
Koo said.343
Charles Zhang of Sohu.com recently made a similar observation to the
Hollywood Reporter:
“The more content we buy, the less piracy we get,” Zhang said. “We
buy the content and we file lawsuits against the pirate sites. Basically,
for domestic TV drama and American TV series, the majority of the
Chinese audience is now watching legitimate content. I’m very happy
to see a campaign that started in 2009 result in such a great victory.
This is an industry with law and order.”344

339. SUNSTEIN, supra note 284, at 38.
340. Mark Lee, Tencent, Sohu, Baidu Unit to Form Online Video Alliance, BLOOMBERG.NET (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-24/tencent-sohubaidu-unit-to-form-online-video-alliance.html (reporting that “Tencent Holdings Ltd.,
Sohu.com Inc., and Baidu Inc.’s iQiyi.com unit said they will form an alliance to offer
online video services in China, a month after industry leader Youku Inc. agreed to buy [ ]
rival [Tudou] to cut costs”).
341. Coonan & Brzeski, supra note 118.
342. See id.
343. Id.
344. Coonan, supra note 2.
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3. Chinese Online Video Websites as a Community of Rival Content
Producers
In addition to the relatively close-knit nature of the “community” of
major Chinese video websites, the second condition for successfully establishing anti-copying norms is also present: the video websites are no
longer just content purchasers and distributors; they are now rival content
producers, as well.345 As exclusive licensees who invested significant sums
to distribute movies and programs online,346 each video website effectively steps into the shoes of the content producer. Furthermore, as Chinese video websites seek to reduce their reliance on licensed content and
the high costs associated with it, and as they seek to differentiate themselves from rivals, several have invested in self-produced films and programs for exclusive distribution through their platforms.347 Norms tend to
be highly role-specific.348 As the Chinese online video sites’ roles shift
from content distributor to content licensee to content producer, the accompanying group norms among the Chinese video websites themselves
have also predictably shifted from no expectation of copyright compliance to high expectations of copyright compliance.
4. Summary
In short, the strategy of pressuring large companies who advertise on
Chinese websites was successful for the following reasons:
• The targeted “powerbrokers”—the advertisers—are members of a
close-knit group of major transnational companies that are owners of valuable IP. IP protection is an important aspect of their identity. Thus, they
could be successfully “shamed” into pressuring the video websites.
• The targeted infringer group—the video websites—form a relatively small, close-knit community of major online video sites in China
that developed a symbiotic relationship with large advertisers.
• While the advertisers are probably poorly positioned to police the
websites on an ongoing basis, because of the close cooperative relationship between the websites and advertisers, the websites were in prime
position to receive the community norms of the advertisers and internalize those norms.
• By obtaining exclusive licenses and becoming content producers as
well, the websites—like other close-knit groups of content producers—
developed an intrinsic need to self-police. This self-policing is possible in
part because infringements that occur on video sites are public and therefore easily discovered and acted upon.
345. See Einhorn, supra note 96; Back & Chao, supra note 110; Li Chen, supra note
150.
346. See supra Part II.A.
347. See Steven Millward, Tencent: Our Video Site is Now China’s Biggest, Ready to
Charge for Hollywood Movies, TECHINASIA (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.techinasia.com/
tencent-video-site-hollywood-content/.
348. SUNSTEIN, supra note 284, at 42.
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B. INFRINGER NORMS AND THE INFRINGEMENT-AS-UNFAIRCOMPETITION APPROACH
The infringement-as-unfair-competition strategy of software producers349 is still relatively early-stage, so fewer conclusions can be drawn.
However, the trend suggests that the conditions for developing successful
anti-infringement norms are relevant to this context, as well. Namely, so
long as promoters of the infringement-as-unfair-competition strategy define their target group broadly (e.g., overseas manufacturers who use pirated software), the approach is unlikely to be as successful as that
employed against the Chinese video sites.
1. Pressuring Foreign Manufacturers by Limiting Access to U.S.
Markets
As discussed in Parts II–III, above, the infringement-as-unfair-competition approach substitutes the U.S. government (federal or state) in the
enforcement chain for governments of jurisdictions where copyright enforcement is weak. By doing so, copyright owners can leverage the U.S.
federal or state government’s control over U.S. market access—doubtless
a key pressure point for many foreign manufacturers. The U.S. state and
federal governments certainly have the ability to influence entities seeking to access their markets. As was the case with the advertisers in the
first case study,350 however, the U.S. federal or state governments are not
in a strong position to control or police the infringement on an ongoing
basis. The government does not have independent information about infringing uses of software by manufacturers overseas, and even if software
companies are able to supply reliable information on infringements, state
attorneys general and the FTC lack the resources to maintain a concerted
and prolonged enforcement campaign against even a fraction of the many
manufacturers using pirated software. The solution is to design the market-pressure strategy so as to help usher in a change in infringer norms
that will enable self-policing, or else to introduce another powerbroker
into the equation that can more effectively control the infringing activity.
2. Diffuse and Loose-Knit Infringer Community
The challenge of initiating a change in infringer norms is manifest.
First, the “community” of non-U.S. manufacturers targeted by this effort
is anything but a small, close-knit group. Unlike the small group of major
Chinese video websites, the universe of large, non-U.S. manufacturing
entities is vast, diverse, and geographically diffuse. Reflecting this diversity and diffusion, the unfair competition strategy so far has not been focused on a single country or industry. Even the relatively few
enforcement actions that state attorneys general have brought to date
have targeted defendants from four different countries (China, Thailand,
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. See supra Part II.A.
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India, and Brazil) and in five different industries (apparel, oil equipment
manufacturing, seafood processing, tire manufacturing, and aerospace).351 Inducing a change in behavioral norms across multiple industries in multiple countries seems like an impossible goal to attain through
a handful of sporadic actions brought by state attorneys general. These
actions have generated international press352 and triggered numerous
global law firms to issue client advisories.353 But it is far from clear that
the actions initiated to date are leading to demonstrable widespread
changes in foreign manufacturers’ infringing behavior, or that a substantial number of similar future actions would.
3. Consumers, Not Producers
Second, in addition to being a loose-knit group, the manufacturers
targeted by the unfair competition strategy are not rival software producers. In this way, they are again distinguishable from the Chinese video
websites, which shifted from infringers of content to exclusive licensees
and then to producers of their own content.354 Unlike the Chinese video
websites, manufacturers targeted by software companies have no obvious
stake in the creation and maintenance of new copyright compliance
norms. A shift from pirated software use to licensed software use would
therefore produce for the infringer no immediate benefit, save eliminating the already remote possibility that the company would be sued, either
for copyright infringement in its home territory or for unfair competition
in the United States. The shift to licensed software would, however, produce immediate harms for the infringer in the form of higher operating
costs.
4. U.S. Retailers as Powerbrokers to Control Infringing Activity
The Washington State IT theft law contains an intriguing alternative.355
By extending liability to major retailers that sell goods produced using
pirated software, the law creates an incentive for those retailers to police
their supply chains. The practice of environmental supply-chain contracting demonstrates that motivating purchasers to contractually impose
351. See supra Part II.B.
352. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty & Shira Ovide, Microsoft Pursues New Tack on Piracy,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303287
804579443442002220098.
353. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. MITCHELL III ET AL., WHITE & CASE LLP, THE EMERGING
RISKS OF UNAUTHORIZED IP IN YOUR SUPPLY CHAIN AND HOW YOU SHOULD RESPOND
(2013) (client advisory issued by Tokyo office of global law firm White & Case); GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, WASHINGTON STATE PASSES NEW UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
TO CRACK DOWN ON PIRATED SOFTWARE (2012) (client advisory issued by global law firm
Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher); Alan C.W. Chiu, Hong Kong: How the US’s New Anti-IT
Theft Approach Affects Asia’s Businesses, MAYER BROWN JSM (Dec. 6, 2012), http://
www.mayerbrown.com/How-the-USs-New-Anti-IT-Theft-Approach-Affects-Asias-Busi
nesses-12-06-2012/ (client advisory issued by Hong Kong office of global law firm Mayer
Brown JSM).
354. See supra Part II.A.
355. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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legal compliance obligations can have positive effects.356 Under the
Washington model, U.S.-based purchasers would be motivated to impose
and police compliance obligations on an ongoing basis or face liability.357
This imposes enforcement costs on purchasers, however, and barring a
shift in infringer norms, this strategy will be effective only if purchasers
can enforce the contract terms in a cost-effective way. Nevertheless, there
are reasons to believe that enforcement costs need not be unduly burdensome. First, many foreign manufacturers and contract suppliers may be
self-motivated to proactively demonstrate compliance. Many suppliers
doubtless understand the importance of cultivating a reputation for professionalism and high standards, and affirmatively demonstrating compliance with contract terms is an effective way to communicate a
commitment to professionalism and standards and retain valued customers. Retailers and purchasers could also form coalitions and organizations
to monitor and improve compliance, as they have done in other areas
such as labor standard compliance.358 Moreover, purchasers no doubt
have to ensure compliance with other contractual commitments from
time to time; so adding this additional requirement to their compliance
checklist does not seem onerous. The real question is how much will copyright compliance increase costs for both sides—if costs are deemed to be
too high, one or both sides will lose motivation, contractual provisions
and even potential secondary liability notwithstanding.
5. Summary
While the jury is still out on the efficacy of the infringement-as-unfaircompetition market-pressure strategy, the following features characterize
the strategy:
• In all unfair competition actions, the targeted powerbroker is a
state. When government at the state (or federal) level chooses to
recognize this theory of unfair competition, it is a formidable powerbroker because it wields considerable leverage over foreign infringers seeking to access U.S. markets.
• The targeted infringer group—foreign manufacturers who utilize
pirated software in their supply chain—is a large, diffuse, and looseknit group of consumers of software, making the challenge of effecting a change in infringer norms daunting.
• The Washington State IT theft law provides for the introduction
of another powerbroker into the enforcement chain: any retailer or
other “third party” that exceeds $50 million in annual revenue, sells
or acquires products produced using infringing software, and has a
contractual relationship with the manufacturer.359 This enables a
more finely tuned market-pressure strategy by motivating the infringer’s powerful U.S.-based business associates to control the in356.
357.
358.
359.

See
See
See
See

supra Part III.B.
supra Part II.B.1.a.
Burkeen, supra note 272, at 249.
supra Part II.B.1.
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fringement. However, without a corresponding shift in infringer
norms, this strategy is only as good as the quality of ongoing enforcement these powerbrokers are willing and able (and motivated) to
provide.
C. IMPLICATIONS

MARKET-PRESSURE STRATEGIES
GOING FORWARD

FOR

The remainder of this Part draws on the above framework to make
recommendations for improving the efficacy of two emerging marketpressure strategies. First, it makes recommendations for optimizing the
infringement-as-unfair-competition strategy going forward.360 Second, it
makes recommendations concerning a developing effort by U.S.-based
copyright owners to undermine infringing websites (frequently based
overseas) by limiting the sites’ access to lucrative online advertising
networks.
1. Going Forward: Infringement-as-Unfair-Competition
a. Selective Targeting of Manufacturers
The discussion above highlights a major challenge for the use of U.S.
unfair competition laws to redress overseas copyright infringement: the
target infringer group is a diverse, diffuse, loose-knit collection of consumers of software goods that do not self-identify around copyright
norms. If, as argued above, norms are key to a successful market-pressure
strategy,361 then the copyright owners’ first step should be to strategically
narrow the universe of targeted infringers. The strategy would be to identify and target small groups of manufacturers in industries evincing relatively robust group dynamics (for example, strong industry associations)
or that are most likely to be receptive to adopting norms of copyright
compliance (perhaps because the industry is known to increasingly value
its own IP). Such a strategy might involve targeting unfair competition
actions exclusively at a few major manufacturers in one particular industry—perhaps even further narrowing that pool to manufacturers in one
country.362
Ideally, this approach would have two important effects. First, high
profile actions will provide high profile notice to other industry members,
for which the message will resonate most profoundly if it appears they are
in a targeted industry. Second, major players that invest in software licenses as a result of an unfair competition action might themselves feel
disadvantaged against competitors using pirated software. This could lead
to circumstances akin to those of the Chinese video websites, whose in360. See supra Parts II.B & IV.B.
361. See supra Part III.D.
362. It is worth noting that the more that targeted actions (especially by government
officials such as state attorneys general) are seen as discriminating against one foreign jurisdiction, the more vulnerable the approach is to scrutiny and possible nullification under
international trade law. See generally Pager & Priest, supra note 182.
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terests aligned with those of copyright owners once the websites invested
in content licenses and piracy directly threatened the value of those investments.363 Once one or a few influential members of an industry group
become stakeholders in relation to the software piracy issue, they may be
willing to employ whatever resources are available through industry associations to positively influence competitors. As more industry members
adopt the software licensing norm, the group norm will become stronger
and the pressure on holdouts greater.
b. The Challenge of Motivating Infringers to Police Themselves,
and the Importance of Activating “Personal” Norms
The preceding paragraphs assume that effective group-based social
sanctions could be brought to bear against nonconforming group members. The challenge with this assumption is that, as noted in Part III, antipiracy norms are most easily developed among producers or distributors
of copyrighted goods, not consumers such as the targeted manufacturers.364 Among consumers, effectuating a shift in personal norms surrounding the use of pirated goods has been the more effective strategy.365
It is easy to imagine that not all—and perhaps not many—industry
groups or associations will have the will or ability to impose effective social sanctions on members that transgress any anti-piracy norms that develop. Assuming group sanctions will often not be available, it makes
sense for proponents of the unfair competition strategy to consider how
to activate “personal” norms against the use of pirated software.
The personal norms of reciprocity and guilt can be powerful deterrents
to self-interested infringing behavior.366 Activating them is a challenge,
however, because they require the internalization of a sense of duty to act
out of guilt or a desire to “repay” the generosity of others.367 Activating
such sentiments and internal commitments in a critical mass of corporate
“persons” is an enormous but potentially achievable task within some
narrow target groups. For example, if the targeted manufacturers are part
363. See supra Part IV.A. The analogy is not perfect, to be sure. Two ways in which this
situation differs from that of the Chinese video websites is that the video websites usually
purchased exclusive licenses, and the content they serve is the very product being monetized. Thus, competitors that serve pirated versions of the same content directly undermine
the exclusive licensee’s revenue stream. As exclusive licensees, the video websites have
“stepped into the shoes” of the copyright owners, naturally helping to facilitate a shift to
copyright compliance norms among major video websites. By contrast, manufacturers who
purchase software licenses are not “stepping into the shoes” of copyright owners, as they
merely acquire nonexclusive licenses to use (not distribute or sell) the software, and competitors who use pirated software do not directly undermine competing manufacturers’
revenue streams. Nevertheless, competitors who use pirated software do enjoy a competitive advantage, at least in theory. They do not have to incur the sometimes substantial
software license fees, and can reinvest those cost savings into their businesses by investing
in capital equipment, hiring additional labor, or engaging in research and development. See
KERR & MOUTRAY, supra note 18, at 8.
364. See supra Part III.D.
365. See supra Part III.D.
366. See supra Part III.D.
367. See supra Part III.D.
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of an industry that values IP, then reaching out to the industry to aid with
IP training or enforcement might help drive home the hypocrisy of pirating someone else’s IP while seeking to enforce one’s own. It might also
activate feelings of reciprocity. Reaching out to other industries in emerging markets to provide training or helpful new technologies might also
activate such sentiments. Imagining the many ways in which software
copyright owners could strategically interact with target manufacturer
communities to activate personal norms is beyond the scope of this Article. The key point is the importance of incorporating into the marketpressure strategy a sophisticated strategy for activating group and even
personal anti-infringement norms.
c. Pressuring U.S.-based Corporate Buyers to Police Infringing
Conduct
Of course, efforts to apply market pressures or effect norm shifts need
not only target the infringers. An alternative strategy is to pressure multinational retailers and corporate buyers, who also potentially benefit
from the cost savings that result from utilizing pirated software in the
upstream supply chain.368 Inducing multinational purchasers to condition
their business on assurances from the supplier that only licensed software
was used in the production of the goods is another way of conditioning
manufacturers’ access to U.S. markets. Even if they do not benefit from
the infringement, holding multinational retailers and purchasers liable
might still be an effective way to avoid harm to the copyright owner.369
The Washington State “Stolen IT” law in fact envisions and enables
this strategy by extending unfair competition liability to certain in-state
third parties such as retailers or companies that outsource production to
manufacturers that use pirated software.370 Indeed, the statute implicitly
recognizes the importance of inculcating “personal” anti-piracy norms in
U.S.-based buyers by expressly rewarding them, through liability exemption, for establishing internal policies and practices aimed at ensuring
their suppliers use licensed software.371 To date, no action has been
brought against third parties under the statute, and aggressive enforcement by the Washington attorney general against in-state retailers and
other businesses may be politically unpalatable. If this statutory provision
is aggressively enforced, however, and if in-state purchasers diligently
monitor their supply chains, this approach is sound and likely effective
from the standpoint of deterring the use of pirated software by overseas
manufacturers.
368. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
369. Levinson, supra note 93, at 1148.
370. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
371. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.330.080(1)(d) (2011) (detailing the third-party liability exemption for any “person [who] has made commercially reasonable efforts to implement
practices and procedures to require its direct manufacturers, in manufacturing articles or
products for such person, not to use stolen or misappropriated information technology”).
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In theory, U.S.-based purchasers could be effective, relatively low-cost
enforcers. As is demonstrated in the environmental contracting context,372 to ensure success the purchasers must diligently enforce their
agreements with suppliers.373 The key difference between the environmental protection and software copyright protection contexts is that the
former is a cause célèbre and U.S.-based companies are responding to
pressure from activist consumers, investors, and environmental NGOs,374
while the latter is not a priority for most outside the software industry,
which wields little direct influence over businesses in other industries.
Employing secondary unfair competition liability is one way the software
industry may motivate downstream U.S.-based purchasers and manufacturers to police their supply chains. Extralegal strategies can also be effective, however. If the software industry makes a compelling case to U.S.
companies and officials about the direct harms to U.S. businesses and the
economy from competing with companies that use pirated IT goods, then
it could stimulate the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for U.S. downstream purchasers to earnestly police their supply chains. The software
industry has made inroads toward persuading U.S. manufacturers that
foreign software piracy hurts revenues and undermines their competitiveness in the global marketplace.375 Concurrently, some current and former
U.S. officials publicly decry foreign software piracy’s broader effects on
the United States’ global competitiveness and jobs outlook and actively
seek ways to remedy the problem.376 These efforts may motivate industry
associations to adopt and enforce voluntary standards and even certification programs aimed at policing supply chains for pirated software use.377
2. Pressuring Brands and Online Ad Networks that Support Global
Infringing Websites
Another copyright battle is escalating with several close parallels to the
case studies analyzed above: copyright owners are pressuring advertisers,
including major brands, whose lucrative ads support infringing websites
accessible in the United States and around the world.378 In a typical copy372. Vandenbergh, supra note 249, at 918, 961, 970 (“The efficacy of this private [environmental] contracting is a function of the extent and content of the standards as well as of
their enforcement”).
373. See supra notes 276–278 and accompanying text.
374. Vandenbergh, supra note 249, at 915, 921–22.
375. See KERR & MOUTRAY, supra note 18, at 4 (study commissioned in part by the
National Association of Manufacturers concluding that software piracy cost U.S. manufacturers $239.9 billion in revenue from 2002–2012 and reduced their innovative capacity,
while costing the U.S. manufacturing sector over 42,000 jobs).
376. See supra note 187–189 and accompanying text.
377. Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 249, at 921–25 (discussing the helpful role that standard-setting in private organizations plays in fostering private-sector policing of environmental abuses).
378. See Jack Marshall, More Ad Dollars Flow to Pirated Video, WALL ST. J. (May 7,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023048109045795079620
05985196; Ben Sisario & Tanzina Vega, Playing Whac-a-Mole with Piracy Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2013, at B3.

2015]

The Emerging Role of Market Ordering

235

right enforcement scenario, the state plays the role of powerbroker, using
its police power to back the copyright owner’s rights in a civil action.379
The state often lacks sufficient leverage over infringing websites, however, because many sites primarily devoted to infringement are based
overseas; thus, obtaining jurisdiction over them as a legal matter, or exercising power over them as a practical matter, is a challenge.380 Even when
the state can properly exercise jurisdiction, website owners may be able
to obscure their identity, creating further enforcement challenges. When
efforts to pass federal legislation designed to provide copyright owners
with more powerful online copyright enforcement tools failed,381 copyright owners and even the White House have looked to private ordering
and market pressures to solve these enforcement challenges by motivating major brands and online advertising networks to more closely monitor their ad placements.382
As the Wall Street Journal recently observed, “It’s easy for websites to
make a profit selling online advertising. All they have to do is avoid paying for content.”383 A 2012 study, funded in part by Google, found that
advertising financially supports 86 percent of peer-to-peer search websites worldwide that facilitate access to a vast array of unlicensed,
downloadable content.384 A 2014 study by Internet consumer advocacy
group the Digital Citizens Alliance385 estimated that large ad-supported
sites that host or link to infringing content average $3–$4 million annually
in ad revenue, and the 596 sites sampled in the study attracted a total of
$226.7 million in ad revenue.386 A 2013 study by the Annenberg Lab at
the University of Southern California identified numerous major brands
whose ads were located on and supporting infringing sites.387 The nearly
three dozen major brands whose ads were observed on multiple infringing sites included American Express, AT&T, BMW, Nokia, State Farm
Insurance, Toyota, Visa, Verizon, and Volkswagen.388
379. See supra Part III.B.
380. See supra Part I.
381. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND THE
NETWORKED PUBLIC SPHERE: MAPPING THE SOPA-PIPA DEBATE (2013).
382. Sisario & Vega, supra note 378; Jon Healey, A Non-SOPA Broadside Aimed at
Online Piracy Hotbeds, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opin
ion-la/la-ol-online-advertising-movie-music-piracy-20130715-story.html; Katy Bachman,
White House Pushes More Voluntary Actions to Protect IP, ADWEEK (June 20, 2013), http://
www.adweek.com/news/technology/white-house-pushes-more-voluntary-actions-protect-ip
-150540.
383. Marshall, supra note 378.
384. BSA SYSTEMS, THE SIX BUSINESS MODELS FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: A
DATA-DRIVEN STUDY OF WEBSITES CONSIDERED TO BE INFRINGING COPYRIGHT 11
(2012).
385. See About Us, DIGITAL CITIZENS ALLIANCE, http://www.digitalcitizensalliance.org/
cac/alliance/content.aspx?page=about (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
386. DIGITAL CITIZENS ALLIANCE, GOOD MONEY GONE BAD: DIGITAL THIEVES AND
THE HIJACKING OF THE ONLINE AD BUSINESS 8 (2014).
387. JONATHAN TAPLIN, U.S.C. ANNENBERG INNOVATION LAB AD TRANSPARENCY
REPORT (Feb. 14, 2013).
388. Id. at 4.
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Under growing pressure from copyright owners and federal officials,
AOL, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo—operators of some of the largest
online advertising networks—developed a set of voluntary best practices.389 Under these guidelines, which the Association of National Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising Agencies have
adopted,390 online ad networks pledge to “[m]aintain policies prohibiting
websites that are principally dedicated to . . . engaging in copyright
piracy,” but need not proactively monitor sites.391 Rather, in the spirit of
the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA),392 ad networks need only ensure that copyright owners can
conveniently notify them about such sites.393 While this leaves the bulk of
the enforcement burden with copyright owners, the guideline’s DMCA
parallels do have the virtue of discouraging copyright owners from using
a market-pressure strategy as an end-run around the DMCA safe harbor.
If copyright owners notify ad networks about a site dedicated to piracy,
the best practices document suggests a wide range of responses: the ad
network can request that the site cease to engage in piracy; it can temporarily stop placing ads on the site until the network confirms it has ceased
infringing; or it can remove the site altogether from the ad network.394
The strategy is similar to the one copyright owners successfully employed in the context of Chinese pirate video streaming sites: single out
the brands whose advertisements appear on infringing websites and
shame them as major IP owners to pressure the websites.395 At first
glance, such a strategy should be even more effective in the United
States, which has a far better copyright enforcement record than China.
To date, however, efforts to pressure brands in the United States have
had little effect on the frequency with which their ads appear on infringing websites.396 What explains this apparent paradox?
The answer appears to lie in the structure of the online ad market in
each country, and in particular in the immediacy of the brand–website
relationship. Counterintuitively, China’s historically poor copyright enforcement record probably facilitated the video websites’ clean-up efforts
beginning in 2009. This is because, given the modest expectations for copyright compliance in China, the market-leading video sites infringed
389. See Healey, supra note 382.
390. Lucia Moses, New Report Says How Much Advertising Is Going to Piracy Sites,
ADWEEK (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/new-reportsays-how-much-advertising-going-piracy-sites-155770#_jmp0_.
391. Best Practices Guidelines for Ad Networks to Address Piracy and Counterfeiting,
available at http://www.2013ippractices.com/bestpracticesguidelinesforadnetworkstoad
dresspiracyandcounterfeiting.html#_jmp0_ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (alteration added)
[hereinafter Best Practices].
392. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
393. See Healey, supra note 382.
394. Best Practices, supra note 391.
395. See supra Part II.A.
396. See Marshall, supra note 378 (“Thanks to the rise of automated ad-buying technologies, more ad dollars are flowing to sites with stolen copyrighted content than ever before,
ad executives say.”).
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openly while simultaneously building lucrative direct relationships with
major brands.397 These relationships afforded the brands influence over
the websites. In the United States, by contrast, the relationship between
brands and infringing sites is far more convoluted, in part because the
high enforcement environment pushes pirate sites underground, resulting
in shadowy operations with no direct relationships with major brands,398
and in part because there are layers of automated and human intermediaries between the brand owner and the website.399 In fact, many
large companies whose ads end up on sites that primarily offer infringing
content claim that they were not aware of their ads’ placement, and that
they do not wish to have their brands associated with such sites.400
Accordingly, copyright owners have had little success effectuating a
change through market pressuring in this context because the enforcement chain too frequently lacks a powerbroker with sufficient leverage
over infringing websites. Although the brand owners’ interests do appear
mostly aligned with those of copyright owners—major brand owners observe general norms around protecting and respecting IP,401 and owners
worry that an association with pirate sites might tarnish their brands402—
they lack the kind of direct relationships with infringing sites that existed
in the context of the Chinese video websites. Brand owners therefore
have little leverage over, or even knowledge of, infringing sites earning
income from their ads. Marketers increasingly use a variety of brokers
and automated ad exchanges to more widely disseminate their ads to
targeted demographics across the Web.403 Through these layers of revolving intermediaries, marketers often lose control of where their ads appear. In addition, even affirmatively blocking ads from appearing on
known pirate sites often has little effect. Unlike the Chinese video websites in 2009, who were themselves building brand loyalty among users
and advertisers, many pirate sites accessible in the United States are not
playing the long game, and they use the opacity of automated ad buying
to their advantage.404 Their strategy is to attract large audiences with free
397. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
398. See Marshall, supra note 378.
399. Suzanne Vranica, A ‘Crisis’ in Online Ads: One-Third of Traffic Is Bogus, WALL
ST. J., (Mar. 23, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304026304
579453253860786362.
400. See Marshall, supra note 378.
401. See id.
402. See id.
403. Id. (“Marketers are increasingly buying online ad space through complicated automated marketplaces and chains of brokers, instead of directly from website owners themselves. When marketers place ads through these channels, they can’t be sure where they
might appear across the Web.”).
404. Id. (“Piracy sites are well aware [that ad networks often lose control over where
their clients’ ads appear on the Internet], and use it to their advantage. Ad executives say it
is relatively easy for these sites to force their way into these automated marketplaces and
to gain access to big-brand ad budgets. Even if those sites are found by ad companies and
blocked from their systems, they often succeed in disguising themselves and finding a way
back in.”); Vranica, supra note 399 (noting the lack of transparency in automated online ad
buying).
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content and bilk ad networks for as long as possible until the advertisers
are alerted and withdraw their ads.405 At that point, the pirate site operators simply re-launch, disguised under a different domain name, and the
cycle begins anew.406 More than one online advertising executive has likened the process to playing a game of “Whac-A-Mole.”407 Under such
circumstances, brand owners’ ability to pressure infringing websites is significantly undermined.
In theory, pressuring online ad networks is a more promising strategy,
since they are intermediaries between brand owners and infringing websites. Online ad networks therefore appear better positioned than brands
to act as powerbrokers over infringing sites. For several reasons, however,
the results of the strategy have been disappointing. First, ad networks’
interests are often misaligned with those of copyright owners, making it
difficult to activate any intrinsic anti-piracy norms or motivations.408 Online ad networks profit from placing ads on the most popular destinations, and sites facilitating peer-to-peer file-sharing access are popular.
According to online usage metrics company TruOptik, peer-to-peer file
sharing remains the third largest digital media and social networking application on the Web, behind only Facebook and YouTube.409 Ad networks that blacklist peer-to-peer sites therefore choose to forgo a
significant source of potential revenue.410 Some appear unwilling to do
that.411 Second, some ad networks drag their feet due to ambiguity over
which sites to sanction.412 The industry best practices suggest contemplating action only against sites that are “principally” dedicated to infringing
uses “and have no substantial non-infringing uses”413—terms that are in405.
406.
407.
408.

Id.; see Marshall, supra note 378.
Id.
See id.; Sisario & Vega, supra note 378.
See Gordon Platt, Advertising Week: Digital Piracy—It’s Worse Than You Think,
PRIVACYNET (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.privacy-net.com/ad-week-digital-piracy-itsworse-than-you-think/ (reporting on an ad industry panel during which panelist Bob
Liodice, CEO of the Association of National Advertisers, opined that one reason the online advertising community has not solved the problem of supporting infringing sites is that
no one in the community has taken “ownership” of the piracy problem, and that to take
control of the problem industry stakeholders must collaborate in a systematic way and
make the piracy problem “personal”).
409. Paul Resnikoff, P2P Is Still Bigger than Spotify, Soundcloud, Twitter, Instagram &
Pandora. . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 4, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/perma
link/2014/06/04/p2p-still-bigger-spotify-soundcloud-twitter-instagram-pandora (citing statistics from TruOptik).
410. JONATHAN TAPLIN, USC ANNENBERG LAB AD TRANSPARENCY REPORT (June 12,
2013) (noting several online ad networks, including Propellerads, ExoClick, Admxr, Adcash, and Infolinks, that repeatedly rank among the top ten networks serving ads to pirate
sites) [hereinafter USC ANNENBERG LAB JUNE 2013 REPORT]; Marshall, supra note 378
(quoting Farnaz Alemi, content protection counsel at the Motion Picture Association of
America, as saying, “While the [online advertising] industry as a whole has some cleaning
up of its act to do, there are some significant players that appear clearly to be turning a
blind eye to blatant infringement—and profiting from it.”).
411. See USC ANNENBERG LAB JUNE 2013 REPORT, supra note 410; Marshall, supra
note 378.
412. See Healey, supra note 382.
413. Best Practices, supra note 391.
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herently imprecise and open to interpretation and debate.414 While some,
such as the Annenberg Lab, use the volume of DMCA takedown notices
that a site receives as a proxy for volume of infringing activity, others
counter that takedown requests are merely unproven allegations and
therefore insufficient to trigger action.415 Third, it is unclear exactly who
is best positioned to pressure the ad networks. Ad networks on the web
are numerous and serve a broad spectrum of marketers from major
brands (many of which are likely to have concerns about being associated
with unlicensed content) down to online gambling outfits and nonbranded companies (many of which probably do not).416 Not all advertisers are necessarily willing to pressure ad networks. Furthermore, trade
groups are unsure about how to apply pressure, or are unwilling to do so.
Although the American Association of Advertising Agencies, for example, has adopted the best practices noted above, they cite antitrust concerns for their reluctance to take a more proactive stance by issuing
“blacklists” of known high-piracy sites.417 In short, there is enough misalignment of interests with copyright owners, and enough legal dubiety,
to effectively stall attempts by copyright owners and some major brands
to pressure the ad networks into more aggressively taking ownership of
the problem.418
The challenges copyright owners face pressuring global infringing sites
demonstrates the limits of the market-pressure strategy. Without a
powerbroker routinely positioned with leverage over infringing sites or
online ad networks, and therefore with no way to effectively transmit extrinsic norms of copyright compliance or activate similar intrinsic norms,
efforts to pressure infringing sites will continue to be frustrated. Given
the opaque and byzantine present structure of the online advertising
ecosystem, the state remains the most potentially effective powerbroker.
A well-tailored legislative solution that gives copyright owners more effective enforcement tools for deterring websites primarily devoted to infringing activities is likely to be more effective than a market-pressure
strategy under the current conditions. Nevertheless, new legislation spe414. See Healey, supra note 382 (noting that this flexibility “leaves the agreement seemingly toothless, but it’s necessitated by the fact that piracy happens on legitimate sites as
well as rogue ones,” and that “there’s a lot of gray area between YouTube [a site with some
infringing content but large amounts of non-infringing content] and the Pirate Bay [a site
with some non-infringing content but large amounts of infringing content]”).
415. Sisario & Vega, supra note 378.
416. See USC ANNENBERG LAB JUNE 2013 REPORT, supra note 410, at 1–2 (noting that
the uTorrent peer-to-peer client reportedly serves over five billion ads every month, most
of which “are for Poker software and other non-branded companies”).
417. Sisario & Vega, supra note 378 (citing comments by Dick O’Brien, the executive
vice president and director of government relations at the American Association of Advertising Agencies).
418. This does not necessarily mean that online ad networks could not be far more
proactive and effective at tackling the problem if they chose to be. As the Future of Music
Coalition blog argued, “[B]rands successfully avoid their products being served on pornographic sites—why should pirate platforms be any different?” Casey, Ad Networks Face
Criticism for Pirate Placements, FUTUREBLOG (Feb. 5, 2013), https://futureofmusic.org/
blog/2013/02/05/ad-networks-face-criticism-pirate-placements.
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cially addressing online infringement is highly unlikely for some time in
the political aftermath of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA).419
Short of a legislative solution, a radical reformation of the online advertising system holds the greatest promise for a successful market-pressure strategy. The prospect is not entirely far-fetched. A handful of
emerging companies provide online IP risk assessment to brands and ad
networks,420 and some Internet ad industry insiders are openly calling for
sweeping structural reform.421 If one goal of the reform is to better enable market pressures to reduce online infringement, the above analysis
may provide some useful guidelines. In general, the closer and more direct the relationship between advertisers and the websites on which their
ads appear, the more leverage the advertisers have over the sites and thus
the more likely a market-pressure strategy is to work. Building direct,
one-to-one relationships between brand owners and websites is the best
way to ensure the proper leverage and accompanying norm transmission.
Given the Web’s immensity, however, limiting one’s online marketing
channels to a relatively small number of key trusted partner sites might
not be realistic for many marketers. In that case, brand owners should
work diligently with major online advertising networks to build trusted ad
networks that permit brand owners to retain significant control over
where their ads are displayed. If the system is structured so that advertisers can hold online ad networks directly accountable for where the ads
appear, then there is far more likely to be an alignment of interests between copyright owners, brand owners, and online ad networks. Such an
alignment will be instrumental in replicating in the United States and
elsewhere the success that copyright owners had pressuring online video
websites in China.
419. See generally BENKLER ET AL., supra note 381; see also Kim Hart, Pols Fear
‘SOPA Backlash,’ POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2012) (“Lawmakers are tiptoeing around issues that
could tick off tech heavyweights such as Google or Amazon. They don’t want a legislative
misstep to trigger the same kind of online revolt that killed the Stop Online Piracy Act in
the House and the Protect IP Act in the Senate in January.”); Christopher S. Stewart, As
Pirates Run Rampant, TV Studios Dial Up Pursuit, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2013), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324906004578292232028509990 (noting the failure
of SOPA and PIPA to pass and that there is no new bill planned); Platt, supra note 408
(quoting Rick Cotton, Senior Counselor for IP Protection at NBCUniversal, as saying, “I
don’t think we’re looking remotely at a legislation solution,” which he viewed in any event
as the “least optimal solution”).
420. See, e.g., Veri-Site Solutions, http://www.veri-site.com/solutions.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2015); WhiteBullet, Brand-Protecting Solutions, http://www.white-bullet.com/
brand-protection-solutions (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
421. See Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice, supra note 14, at 251;
Randall Rothenberg, IAB Head: ‘The Digital Advertising Industry Must Stop Having Unprotected Sex,’ BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/iab-randallrothenberg-supply-chain-2014-2 (op-ed by president and CEO of trade association the Interactive Advertising Bureau, arguing that problems such as click fraud, privacy concerns,
and copyright piracy are “symptoms of a more destructive failing: The digital advertising
supply chain is too open,” and “industry behavior change [is needed] at an unprecedented
scale”).
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CONCLUSION
Faced with ineffective law enforcement options for widespread infringement in numerous emerging markets, copyright owners are emulating a strategy used with increasing frequency by stakeholders in other
compliance-challenged fields such as environmental protection and labor
conditions:422 motivate influential third parties to pressure wrongdoers
into legal compliance. In particular, copyright owners are experimenting
with market pressure points that impose economic hardship on businesses
that benefit from infringement. Since severe copyright enforcement challenges in many territories are unlikely to be resolved quickly, transnational market pressuring will be an increasingly important part of the
international IP landscape. Until now, however, little analysis has been
done to understand these strategies’ effects, find commonalities, and
identify what factors are most likely to predict success. The case study on
advertisers’ successful pressuring of online video sites in China demonstrates that under the right conditions, the model can be successful and
beneficial for all the key stakeholders: copyright owners, intermediaries
or “powerbrokers,” the public, and even the infringers.
Motivating a well-positioned “powerbroker” intermediary to coerce infringers into copyright compliance can be an appealing and effective option. A powerbroker might be a private entity that has influence over the
infringer, or it might be a U.S. state government, for example, that conditions access to state markets on the infringer’s compliance with the copyright laws of the infringer’s home country.
A market-pressure strategy is most likely to be successful when it takes
into account the interplay between indirect enforcement (finding a suitable “powerbroker” to pressure infringers) and social norms theory. The
most effective strategy will induce the infringer group to comply with
copyright on an ongoing basis. The above analysis of market-pressure
strategies targeting online advertisers in both China and the United
States demonstrates that swaying infringer group norms toward copyright
compliance is most likely to occur when the infringer group is close-knit
and has a direct relationship with, and is directly influenced by, the pressuring intermediary. Having direct influence helps the intermediary transmit, and the infringer group internalize, norms of copyright compliance.
Ongoing enforcement may then be achieved through self-policing within
the infringer group as a result of internalized anti-infringement norms.
The more closely the infringer group members’ interests come to be aligned with those of copyright owners, the more likely the strategy will be
successful. Thus, when infringing Chinese video websites feared losing advertisers and therefore bought exclusive content licenses and produced
their own content, their interests closely aligned with copyright owners’
and the websites became highly motivated to police infringement within
their own community.
422. See supra Part III.C.
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If achieving a shift in infringer norms is impracticable, it may be possible to induce a “powerbroker” intermediary to contractually impose standards on business partners engaged in infringement, and perhaps even to
develop industry-wide standards and best practices around expectations
of copyright compliance. These intermediaries will incur enforcement
costs, however. That approach is therefore only as effective as the intermediaries’ willingness and ability to incur those costs on an ongoing
basis.

